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HANDLING THE FAILURE OF A GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED ENTERPRISE
Richard Scott Carnell*
Abstract: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are huge, fast-growing, highly leveraged, lightly
regulated, and susceptible to failure. Prudence calls for having a legal mechanism adequate
for handling their failure. Yet no adequate insolvency mechanism currently exists for them.
Unlike ordinary business firms, these government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) cannot
liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code. If Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac became
sufficiently troubled, its regulator could appoint a conservator to take control of the firm and
attempt to restore its financial health. But by then the firm's problems could well have
become too severe for the conservator to resolve. The conservatorship statute provides no
means for effectuating a reorganization and does not expressly authorize a liquidation.
Uncertainty about the priority of and process for handling creditors' claims could worsen the
firm's problems and increase the risk of disrupting financial markets and eliciting a costly
congressional rescue. By enacting a workable insolvency mechanism, Congress could avoid
using public money or credit to rescue a troubled GSE's creditors. Congress should specify
priorities among creditors' claims, authorize appointment of a receiver, and empower the
receiver to reorganize the GSE or establish an interim firm to carry on the GSE's business.
Alternatively, Congress could allow GSEs to liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy
Code.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae or Fannie)'
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac or
Freddie) 2 are huge, fast-growing, highly leveraged, lightly regulated, and
susceptible to failure.3 Prudence calls for having a legal mechanism
adequate for handling their failure. Yet no adequate insolvency
mechanism currently exists for them. Unlike ordinary business firms,
they cannot liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code.
4 If
Fannie or Freddie became sufficiently troubled, its regulator could
appoint a "conservator" to take control of the firm and attempt to restore
the firm's financial health.5 But by then the firm's problems could well
have become too severe for a conservator to resolve.6 The conservator
would have only limited powers. The conservatorship statute provides
no means for effectuating a reorganization 8 (i.e., a modification of
creditors' claims9) and does not expressly authorize a liquidation.' 0
Moreover, uncertainty about the priority of and process for handling
creditors' claims against the firm could worsen the firm's problems and
increase the risk of disrupting financial markets and eliciting a costly
congressional rescue. 1
Fannie and Freddie are "government-sponsored enterprises" (GSEs):
privately owned financial institutions with special ties to the federal
government. 12 Together the three largest GSEs-Fannie, Freddie, and
the Federal Home Loan Bank System-have become one-third the size
of the entire U.S. commercial banking industry.' 3 Yet GSEs have
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716, 1717, 1718. 1719, 1723(b), 1723a, 1723c (2000).
2. Id. §§ 1451-1459.
3. See infra Part I.B, C, .E.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.1.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 327-30.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 319-30.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 324-26.
9. A reorganization could modify creditors' claims by, for example, extending repayment,
lowering interest rates, varying other credit terms, or converting some debt to equity. As used in this
Article, "reorganization" does not include a "recapitalization," which here denotes raising equity
without modifying creditors' claims.
10. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 388-96.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 20-30.
13. See table infra p. 574 (showing that Fannie, Freddie, and Federal Home Loan Bank System
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received remarkably little scrutiny from legal scholars14-far less than
banks have. Few law review articles give GSEs any sustained
attention. 15 Some articles focus on individual GSEs 16 or very specialized
topics. 17 More commonly, scholars briefly discuss GSEs as they relate to
some other topic. 18 No law review article deals adequately with GSEs'
ambiguous relationship to the government. This scholarly neglect is
particularly unfortunate given GSEs' size and importance-and the legal
and policy issues posed by the inadequacy of the current regulatory
(FHLBS) together had $2.58 trillion in total assets on Dec. 31, 2003); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
FDIC QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE, Fourth Quarter 2003, at 6 [hereinafter FDIC BANKING
PROFILE 4Q-2003] (showing that commercial banks insured by Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) had $7.60 trillion in total assets).
14. Thomas H. Stanton, a practicing lawyer who teaches public administration at Johns Hopkins
University, is the most knowledgeable and prolific writer bringing legal insight to GSE policy
issues. See generally THOMAS H. STANTON, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES:
MERCANTILIST COMPANIES IN THE MODERN WORLD (2002) [hereinafter STANTON, GSES];
THOMAS H. STANTON, A STATE OF RISK: WILL GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES BE THE
NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS? (1991) [hereinafter STANTON, A STATE OF RISK].
15. A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543,
deals with GSEs as part of a larger study of government corporations. Bradley K. Krehely,
Government Sponsored Enterprises: A Discussion of the Federal Subsidy of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 519 (2002), focuses on policy issues involving Fannie and
Freddie. Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises Are "Too Big to Fail":
Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 992 (1993), proceeds from the
assumption that "[t]hese part-private, part-public institutions are indispensable components of the
nation's economy and are 'too big to fail,"' id. at 992, and thus does not consider many of the issues
discussed in this article.
16. See generally, e.g., Richard W. Bartke, Fannie Mae and the Secondary Mortgage Market, 66
Nw. U. L. REV. I (1971); Richard W. Bartke, Home Financing at the Crossroads-A Study of the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 48 IND. L.J. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Bartke, Home
Financing]; Dirk S. Adams, FIRREA and the New Federal Home Loan Bank System, 32 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 17 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Congress and Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the Kettle
Black?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 435-39 (2003) (likening federal government's use of GSEs to Enron's
use of special-purpose vehicles); John L. Brown, Federal Preemption of the State Regulation of
Agricultural Credit, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 563, 571-74 (2002) (examining federal preemption of
state usury restrictions).
18. See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 47, 56-57 (1999) (characterizing implicit government backing of GSEs as type of guarantee
relationship); Amy C. Bushaw, Small Business Loan Pools: Testing the Waters, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 197, 217-19, 252-56 (1998) (explaining how establishing GSE to securitize
bank loans to small businesses could improve small businesses' access to credit); Anthony D. Taibi,
Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory,
Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1530-31 (1994)(noting that proposed community development financial institutions fund would be government
agency, not GSE).
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structure. 
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This Article aims to help fill that gap. Part I introduces the five GSEs
and sketches their business activities and financial importance. It
explains how their government sponsorship impairs market discipline,
enriches shareholders, and promotes artificial growth and excessive risk-
taking. It also argues that the government, by timely adopting workable
insolvency mechanisms, could avoid using public money or credit to
rescue an insolvent GSE's creditors. Part II examines the political
economy of GSEs and explains how ambiguity about government
backing of GSEs both blunts accountability for the risks and other costs
of government sponsorship and helps account for the central failures of
GSE policy. These failures include applying inadequate financial-safety
rules to GSEs (e.g., weak capital requirements and no adequate
insolvency mechanism for Fannie and Freddie) and not demanding
adequate public benefits from GSEs. Part III draws on bank insolvency
law-the principal model for the specialized insolvency regimes for
Fannie, Freddie, and other GSEs-to develop criteria for assessing the
adequacy of GSE insolvency regimes, which follow bank insolvency law
only imperfectly. Part IV examines GSE insolvency regimes and
concludes that the regime for Fannie and Freddie has grave deficiencies
and that the regimes for the other three GSEs need improvement. Part V
explores the potential practical consequences of these deficiencies. Part
VI sets forth criteria for correcting the deficiencies of current law,
19. Since 1999 1 have repeatedly stressed the importance of having adequate insolvency
mechanisms for GSEs. See, e.g., Richard S. Carnell, Improving the Regulation of Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks: Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 8-9, 15 (Feb. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Camell, 2004 Senate
Testimony], http://banking.senate.gov/-files/camell.pdf (noting that, unlike business corporations or
FDIC-insured depository institutions, Fannie and Freddie face no credible, workable insolvency
mechanism and that lack of such mechanism reinforces perception that government implicitly backs
Fannie and Freddie; and arguing that Congress should authorize receivership or make Bankruptcy
Code apply); Reforming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 107th Cong. 30, 31-32, app. at 135-36, 141 (2001) (statement of Richard S. Carnell)
(noting that Fannie and Freddie, unlike FDIC-insured depository institutions, face no credible,
workable receivership mechanism and that lack of such mechanism reinforces perception that
government implicitly backs Fannie and Freddie); Richard Scott Camell, Federal Deposit Insurance
and Federal Sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: The Structure of Subsidy, in SERVING
Two MASTERS YET OUT OF CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 56, 64-66 (Peter J.
Wallison ed., 2001) [hereinafter SERVING TWO MASTERS YET OUT OF CONTROL] (same); Richard
S. Camell, Federal Deposit Insurance and Federal Sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
The Structure of Subsidy, in 2 PUBLIC PURPOSES AND PRIVATE INTERESTS: FANNIE MAE AND
FREDDIE MAC 71, 78-79 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 1999) (same). This Article sets forth more fully the
legal and policy rationales for this position.
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explains how a troubled GSE could be reorganized, analyzes recent
congressional reform proposals, and considers GSEs' objections to
receivership. Part VII concludes that Congress should act now to provide
a receivership mechanism for Fannie and Freddie and broaden the
authority of receivers for Farm Credit System institutions and Farmer
Mac.
I. BACKGROUND
GSEs are specialized, privately owned, federally chartered financial
institutions. Bond-market investors infer from the GSEs' federal ties that
the government implicitly backs the GSEs. This perception of
government backing reduces the GSEs' borrowing costs and impairs
market discipline on the GSEs, enabling the GSEs to grow larger and
take greater risks than they could as fully private firms. The GSEs do not
provide public benefits commensurate with the subsidies they receive
from their government sponsorship. Moreover, despite government
financial-soundness regulation, the GSEs remain vulnerable to failure.
This Part defines "government-sponsored enterprise," introduces the
GSEs and their businesses, and notes the GSEs' rapid growth and
financial importance. It examines the consequences of government
sponsorship, including reduced market discipline, higher return for
shareholders, extraordinary growth, and increased risk to the financial
system. It explains how current GSE financial-soundness regulation fails
to provide an adequate substitute for market discipline. Finally, it
considers whether the government could avoid rescuing an insolvent
GSE's creditors.
A. Defining GSEs
A GSE is a federally chartered, privately owned, privately managed
financial institution that has only specialized lending and guarantee
powers and that bond-market investors perceive as implicitly backed by
the federal government.20 Several aspects of this definition bear
emphasis. First, GSEs have charters granted by or pursuant to an act of
20. This definition broadly accords with definitions used in the Congressional Budget Act, 2
U.S.C. § 622(8) (2000), and by STANTON, GSES, supra note 14, at 1-2. See also 12 U.S.C. § 2277a-
4(a)(4) (2000) (defining GSE, for purposes of Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation premium
formula, as "an entity that is chartered by Congress to serve a public purpose and the debt
obligations of which are not explicitly guaranteed by the United States").
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Congress; ordinary business corporations have state charters.21 Second,
GSEs' private ownership and private management underscore that GSEs
form no part of the government, unlike executive departments (e.g., the
Department of the Treasury),22 independent agencies (e.g., the Securities
and Exchange Commission),23 or government corporations (e.g.,
Amtrak, Ginnie Mae, and the U.S. Postal Service).24 Thus a GSE cannot
exercise sovereign powers25 and lacks authority to bind the government
financially.26 Third, although GSEs are financial institutions, they have
only specialized lending and guarantee powers-powers much narrower
than those (for example) of national banks, federal savings associations,
and federal credit unions.27 Fourth, and most importantly, bond-market
investors believe that the government implicitly backs each GSE and
would not let a GSE's creditors go unpaid.28 In the words of a prominent
financial writer, GSEs "are regarded by most people who lend them
money as the government in disguise.,,29 This perceived implicit backing
is the GSEs' most important and most distinctive characteristic. 30 It
21. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12
(1987).
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "Executive department"); id. § 105 (defining "Executive
agency" as an "Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent
establishment").
23. Id. § 104 (defining "independent establishment").
24. Id. § 103(1) (defining "Government corporation"). For a lucid scholarly analysis of
government corporations, with some attention to GSEs, see generally Froomkin, supra note 15.
Although GSEs are not government agencies, bond-market participants persist in referring to
GSEs' debt securities as "agency securities," see, e.g., MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 41-
42 (3d ed. 1990), often himping them together with securities of government corporations like
Ginnie Mae-securities backed by the government's full faith and credit.
25. 2 U.S.C. § 622(8)(B)(i).
26. Id. § 622(8)(B)(ii). See 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 262, 264 (1982) (concluding that "when
Congress authorizes a federal agency or officer to incur obligations, those obligations are supported
by the full faith and credit of the United States, unless the authorizing statute specifically provides
otherwise"); Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) (referring to "the
ordinarily presumed power of Government agencies authorized to incur obligations to pledge the
credit of the United States").
27. For examples of the breadth of ordinary depository institutions' powers, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(b)-(c), (k)-(l), (n) (2000) (federal savings associations); id. § 1757 (federal credit unions);
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ACTIVITIES PERMISSIBLE FOR A NATIONAL
BANK (2003) (national banks).
28. See infra Part 1.D.2.
29. STIGUM, supra note 24, at 358.
30. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ASSESSING THE PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FANNIE MAE
AND FREDDIE MAC ix (1996) [hereinafter CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS].
Washington Law Review Vol. 80:565, 2005
enables GSEs to borrow vast sums from bond-market investors 31 at
interest rates below those available to the most creditworthy fully private
firms, 32 even though GSEs have much higher debt-to-equity ratios than
those firms.33 Without the perception of implicit backing, GSEs would
be smaller, less heavily indebted, and less likely to endanger the U.S.
financial system if they failed. The GSEs' perceived implicit backing
plays a major role in shaping both GSEs themselves and the policy
concerns they raise.
31. See table infra p. 574 (showing that GSEs' liabilities totaled $2.58 trillion on Dec. 31, 2003).
32. See Wayne Passmore, Shane M. Sherlund & Gillian Burgess, The Effect of Housing
Government-Sponsored Enterprises on Mortgage Rates, 33 REAL ESTATE ECON. (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript at exhs.3 & 4) (showing that Fannie and Freddie had lower long-term borrowing
costs from 1998 through 2003 than non-GSE firms rated AAA or AA); Brent W. Ambrose & Arthur
Warga, Measuring Potential GSE Funding Advantages, 25 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 129, 146
(2002) (noting that from 1995 through 1999, the three housing GSEs "enjoyed an average advantage
of between 25 to 29 basis points over 'AA' banking sector bonds, between 43 and 47 basis points
over 'A' rated bonds, and between 76 and 80 basis points for 'BBB' rated banking issues"); CBO,
PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 10-11 (noting that government sponsorship
"transforms the market's view of the credit quality of the housing GSEs and vaults their securities
from a rating of A or Aa based on their intrinsic financial condition to super Aaa because the risk of
default is seen to be lower than on even the highest-rated fully private securities").
Fannie Mae's market-value insolvency during the early 1980s underscores how GSEs can borrow
on favorable terms even when failing to meet basic standards of creditworthiness:
In 1981 ... the estimated market value of Fannie Mae's net worth was reported to have
declined to a negative $11 billion. Under these circumstances, a wholly private firm would
typically be blocked from borrowing or ... permitted to borrow only at extremely high rates of
interest. Indeed, some private firms in that situation would be forced into liquidation once the
general creditors learned the facts. Fannie Mae, however, was able to continue borrowing very
large amounts ($31 billion in long-term debt and $64 billion in short-term funds in 1981 and
1982) with only a brief increase in its borrowing costs. Throughout the episode, Fannie Mae
retained the highest credit rating possible ....
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: THE GOVERNMENT'S
EXPOSURE TO RISKS, GAO/GGD-90-97, at 9 (1990) [hereinafter GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S
EXPOSURE TO RISKS].
33. Compare table infra p. 574 (indicating debt-to-equity ratio of 44:1 for Fannie and 24:1 for
Freddie as of Dec. 31, 2003), with George G. Kaufman, Capital in Banking: Past, Present and
Future, 5 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 385, 387 tbl.2, 390 tbl.3 (1991) (showing capital-to-assets ratios in
various industries). The capital-to-assets ratios in Kaufman, supra, imply debt-to-equity ratios
approximating 4:1 in finance, 3:1 in services, and 1.6:1 in manufacturing (assuming that capital
equals equity and that debt equals total assets minus capital).
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B. The Five GSEs
Five GSEs exist 34: Fannie Mae, 35 Freddie Mac, 36 the Federal Home
Loan Bank System (FHLBS), 37 the Farm Credit System (FCS), 38 and the
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac). 39 A sixth
GSE, the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), dissolved
itself in December 2004 after transferring its business to non-GSE
affiliates. 40 Fannie, Freddie, and Farmer Mac have shares listed on the
Fannie and Freddie had lower long-term borrowing costs than AAA-rated General Electric
Capital Corporation (GECC) from 1998 through 2003, even though GECC had a much lower debt-
to-equity ratio. See Passmore, Sherlund & Burgess, supra note 32 (manuscript at 17-18, exhs.3 &
4). GECC's year-end debt-to-equity ratio averaged less than 7.4:1 during that period (based on a
simple average of the year-end ratios shown in GECC's annual reports) and never exceeded 8.5:1.
See GEN'L ELEC. CAPITAL CORP., FORM 10-K/A FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DEC. 31,2004, at 12
(2005) (showing ratios for 2000-2003); GEN'L ELEC. CAPITAL CORP., FORM 10-K FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR ENDED DEC. 31, 2000, at 13 (2001) (showing ratios for 1998-2000).
34. In referring to five GSEs, this article treats the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS)
and Farm Credit System (FCS) each as a single enterprise, treats Farmer Mac as separate from the
Farm Credit System, and disregards three pseudo-GSEs: the Financing Corporation, Resolution
Funding Corporation, and Financial Assistance Corporation. Although the FHLBS and FCS each
comprise multiple institutions, those institutions have joint-and-several liability for the system's
consolidated obligations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1431(b)-(c) (2000) (FHLBS); id. § 2155 (FCS). FCS
institutions also have a common insurance fund. See id. §§ 2277a-1, 2277a-4, 2277a-9. Farmer Mac,
although technically "an institution of the Farm Credit System," id. § 2279aa-1(a)(2), is separately
owned and economically independent. See, e.g., id. § 2279aa-1 (a)(3) (specifying that Farmer Mac
and FCS are not liable for each other).
During the late 1980s Congress established three pseudo-GSEs designed to avoid the budgetary
constraints of the Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat.
1037. The Financing Corporation, 12 U.S.C. § 1441, and the Resolution Funding Corporation, id.
§ 1441b, facilitated assistance to depositors of failed savings institutions. The Financial Assistance
Corporation, id. §§ 2278b to 2278b- 11, helped rescue the Farm Credit System. Unlike real GSEs,
these pseudo-GSEs had no business activities, no opportunity for profit, no voluntary shareholders,
and no meaningful managerial discretion; they served merely as vehicles for a budgetary subterfuge.
See Froomkin, supra note 15, at 615 (characterizing those entities as "little more than an accounting
trick").
35. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1717, 1718, 1719, 1723(b), 1723a, 1723c.
36. Id. §§ 1451-1459.
37. Id. §§ 1421-1449.
38. Id. §§ 2001-2279g.
39. Id. §§ 2279aa-1 to 2279aa-14.
40. Congress chartered Sallie Mae in 1972 to create a secondary market for insured student loans.
Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 133(a), 86 Stat. 235, 265; H.R. REP. No. 92-
554, at 28-29 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2489-90. In 1993 Congress curtailed
federal student loan guarantees, authorized direct federal loans to students, and began charging
Sallie Mae an annual fee. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§§ 4011-4112, 107 Stat. 312, 341-70. Faced with increased borrowing costs and the loss of its main
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New York Stock Exchange. 41 Federal Home Loan Banks and Farm
Credit System institutions are cooperatives owned by their member-
borrowers.42
The following table summarizes the five GSEs' assets, liabilities,
guarantees, 43 market capitalization, debt-to-equity ratios, and recent
growth:
44
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
As of Dec. 31, 2003; Billions of Dollars
Fannie Freddie FHLBS FCS Farmer
Total Assets 1,010 803 764 104 4.3
Total Liabilities 987 770 727 93 4.1
Outstanding Guarantees 1,300 752 0 0 1.0
Market Capitalization 73 40 n/a n/a 0.5
Book-Value Shareholders' Equity 22 31 36 7 0.2
Debt-to-Equity Ratio 44 24 20 13 19
Annual Asset Growth Rate, 1993-2003 37% 86% 1 33% 6% 85%
Market capitalization equals number of outstanding shares multiplied by closing share price
Debt-to-equity ratio equals total liabilities divided by shareholders' equity
Asset growth rate reflects average annual growth in total assets, Dec. 31, 1993 -Dec. 31, 2003
As the table indicates, the GSEs differ greatly in size. All but one
underwent extraordinary growth during the past decade. The outlier-
business, see generally Mark Overend, The Privatization of Sallie Mae, in SERVING TwO MASTERS
YET OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 19, at 170 (explaining why government sponsorship had become
less desirable), Sallie Mae supported legislation ending its government sponsorship. Student Loan
Marketing Association Reorganization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, tit. VI, § 602(a), 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-275 to 3009-290 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (2000)). Sallie Mae dissolved in
December 2004. See Dawn Kopecki, Sallie Mae Completes Privatization 4 Years Early, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 30, 2004, at C3.
41. See N.Y. Stock Exchange, Listed Company Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/
lcF.html?ListedComp=All (last visited July 7, 2005).
42. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1424(a)(1), 1426, 1429, 1430(a) (FHLBS); id. § 2154a(c)(1)(D)-(E) (FCS).
43. "Outstanding guarantees" refers to the unpaid principal balance of mortgage-backed securities
guaranteed by the GSE and held by someone other than the GSE.
44. Data on total assets, total liabilities, outstanding guarantees, shareholders' equity, and number
of shares outstanding are from the following GSE reports: FARM CREDIT SYS., ANNUAL
INFORMATION STATEMENT-1996, at 3 (1997); FARM CREDIT SYS., ANNUAL INFORMATION
STATEMENT-2003, at F-32 (2004); FARMER MAC, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1997); FED. AGRIC.
MORTGAGE CORP., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 9, 52 (1997); FED. HOME LOAN BANK SYS., 1995
FINANCIAL REPORT 5, 20 (1996); FED. HOME LOAN BANK SYS., 2003 FINANCIAL REPORT 20, 38-
39 (2004); FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N, [1994] INFORMATION STATEMENT, at 15, 39-40 (1995);
FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N, FORM 10-K FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DEC. 31, 2003, at 24-25
(2004) [hereinafter FANNIE MAE, 2003 FORM 10-K]; FREDDIE MAC, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 35
(1994); FREDDIE MAC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 29, 69, 176 (2004). Closing share prices are from
NYSE Composite Transaction.°, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2004, at C2. Fannie will restate its financial
statements, which may change data in the table.
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the Farm Credit System--operates under financial-soundness rules
modeled on those for commercial banks, rules generally more stringent
than those applicable to other GSEs.45
1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Fannie and Freddie help fund residential mortgage loans in two basic
ways. The first involves creating and guaranteeing mortgage-backed
46
securities. Fannie and Freddie buy loans originated by banks, savings
institutions, and mortgage bankers; put many loans of the same type
(e.g., recently originated first mortgages) together in a loan "pool"; and
sell investors "mortgage-backed securities" representing interests in that
pool.47 The GSEs receive fees for guaranteeing that holders of mortgage-
backed securities will receive timely payments of principal and interest
on the securities in the pool.48 The guarantee entails modest credit risk to
the GSEs arising from the possibility that homebuyers will default on
their loans and that the value of the property will not cover the balance
due on the loans.49
Fannie and Freddie also help fund mortgage loans by holding
mortgage-backed securities (and to a much lesser extent, mortgages) in
their own portfolios. The GSEs borrow money from investors by issuing
debt securities (e.g., bonds, notes, and debentures) and use the proceeds
to buy their own mortgage-backed securities. 50 This portfolio-investment
business generates most of the GSEs' profits: the GSEs borrow money
cheaply in the government securities market and invest it at the higher
rate available in the mortgage-backed securities market. 51 But these
higher profits entail higher risk. Portfolio investment accounts for most
of the GSEs' risk exposure.52 In borrowing vast sums to invest in
45. See GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 98; see, e.g., 12
C.F.R. § 615.5205 (2004) (generally requiring each FCS institution to have permanent capital that
equals or exceeds 7% of institution's risk-adjusted asset base).
46. See generally I TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES § 2.5 (1991).
47. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Statement Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs I n.1 (Feb. 24, 2004), http:/Ibanking.
senate.gov/_files/ACF I BA.pdf [hereinafter Greenspan, 2004 Senate Testimony].
48. See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSES 9 (2001)
[hereinafter CBO, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES].
49. CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 5.
50. GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 20.
51. See CBO, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES, supra note 48, at 8.
52. See generally Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Government-Sponsored
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mortgage-backed securities, the GSEs face interest-rate risk, the risk that
a rise in interest rates will reduce the market value of the mortgage-
backed securities; prepayment risk, the risk that lower interest rates will
prompt borrowers to pay off their loans, shorten the duration of the
mortgage-backed securities, and effectively force the GSEs into lower-
yielding investments; as well as the credit risk of the mortgages
underlying the mortgage-backed securities.
53
2. Federal Home Loan Bank System
The Federal Home Loan Bank System consists of twelve regional
Federal Home Loan Banks (FHL Banks).54 Each FHL Bank, owned by
its member commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions,
55
has its own management and board of directors.56 The FHLBS raises
money by selling investors debt securities for which the twelve FHL
Banks are jointly and severally liable.57 The FHL Banks loan the
proceeds to their member institutions and hold the loans in portfolio.
58
The member institutions, in turn, can lend the money to their own
customers. The FHL Banks accept deposits from their member
institutions,59 provide check-clearing and other payment-related services
to those institutions, 60 and operate affordable housing programs. 61 Like
Fannie and Freddie, they also hold large securities portfolios.62
Enterprises: Remarks to the Conference on Housing, Mortgage Finance, and the Macroeconomy,
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (May 19, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/
Speeches/2005/20050519/default.htm.
53. See GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 31-32. More
specifically, the GSEs' interest-rate risk includes the risk that a rise in interest rates will reduce the
market value of GSEs' investments without correspondingly reducing the market value of the
liabilities funding those investments. See generally id. at 31-33 (summarizing ways in which GSEs
face interest-rate risk).
54. See 12 U.S.C. § 1423 (2000); 12 C.F.R. pt. 905, app. A (2004).
55. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1424(a)(1), 1426, 1429, 1430(a).
56. See id. § 1427(a).
57. See id. § 143 1(b)-(c); 12 C.F.R. pt. 966. See generally David Nickerson & Ronnie J. Phillips,
The Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Farm Credit System: Historic Parallels and
Implications for Systemic Risk, in Too BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT
BAILOUTS 107 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004) (discussing potentially problematic parallels between
FHLBS and FCS, including joint-and-several liability).
58. See GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 22.
59. See 12 U.S.C. § 1431(e)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 969.2.
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 1431(e)(2); 12 C.F.R. pt. 975.
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(i)-); 12 C.F.R. pt. 951.
62. See 12 U.S.C. § 1431(h); 12 C.F.R. pt. 956.
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3. Farm Credit System
The Farm Credit System comprises a network of cooperatives that
operate as portfolio lenders. 63 It includes ninety-one agricultural credit
associations and eleven land credit associations, each owned by its
farmer- or rancher-borrowers; five farm credit or agricultural credit
banks, each owned by its member associations; and the Federal Farm
Credit Banks Funding Corporation, owned by its member banks.64 That
corporation raises money for the credit banks by selling investors debt
securities, 65 for which the credit banks are jointly and severally liable.
66
The credit associations borrow from the credit banks and lend to
farmers.67 The Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation guarantees
timely payment of FCS obligations.
68
4. Farmer Mac
Farmer Mac purchases loans secured by agricultural land and rural
housing and guarantees securities backed by such loans.69 It also holds a
portfolio of mortgaged-backed and other securities.70  Although
originally created strictly as a guarantor, Farmer Mac now derives most
of its income from holding loans and securities, including securities
unrelated to agriculture.71
63. Unlike the other GSEs, the Farm Credit System originates loans and does not operate in the
secondary market.
64. See 12 U.S.C. § 2002(a) (defining "Farm Credit System"); id. § 2154a(c)(l)(D)-(E)
(requiring anyone borrowing from FCS institution to buy institution's shares but allowing only
agricultural producers to own voting shares). For the number of FCS institutions of various types,
see Farm Credit Administration, FCS Institutions, http://www.fca.gov/FCS-Institutions.htm (last
visited July 7, 2005).
65. See 12 U.S.C. § 2160(b)(1).
66. See id. § 2155.
67. See GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 21-22.
68. See 12 U.S.C. § 2277a-1.
69. See id. §§ 2279aa-3(a), 2279aa-3(c)(12)-(13), 2279aa-5, 2279aa-6(a).
70. See id. §§ 2279aa-3(c)(12), 2279aa-6(e).
71. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT NEEDED FOR NONMORTGAGE INVESTMENTS, GAO/GGD-98-48, at 29 (1998)
[hereinafter GAO, GSES' NONMORTGAGE INVESTMENTS]; see also id. at 24 (questioning Farmer
Mac's viability without government sponsorship). See generally Interest Rate Farming, GRANT'S
INT. RATE OBSERVER, July 3, 1998, at 10-11.
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C. GSEs' Growth and Financial Importance
Fannie and Freddie are huge. At the end of 2003, they together had
$1.81 trillion in total assets and $1.76 trillion in total liabilities.7 They
had also guaranteed $2.05 trillion in outstanding mortgage-backed
securities held by other investors.73 The five GSEs together had $2.68
trillion in total assets and $2.58 trillion in total liabilities.74 By
comparison, the federal government's entire publicly held debt totaled
$4.07 trillion, 75 U.S. commercial banks had combined total assets of
$7.60 trillion,76 and U.S. corporate shares had a combined market value
of $13.06 trillion.77
Fannie and Freddie have grown rapidly since the early 1990s. 78 For
example, from 1993 through 2003:79
" their combined total assets rose 503%, from $301 billion to $1.81
trillion; 8
0
* their combined total liabilities-mostly in the form of debt
72. See table supra p. 574.
73. See table supra p. 574. Fannie and Freddie guarantee prompt payment of principal and
interest on their mortgage-backed securities. These guarantees create a loss contingency-not
included in the GSEs' total liabilities-reflecting the possibility that the GSEs might incur liability
on the guarantees. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES 4 (1975) (defining "loss
contingency").
74. See table supra p. 574.
75. See FIN. MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULL., Dec. 2004, at 29
tbl.FD-1.
76. See FDIC BANKING PROFILE 4Q-2003, supra note 13, at 6.
77. FED. RESERVE BD., FED. RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, Fourth Quarter 2003, at 90 tbl.L.213, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/20040304/zl r-4.pdf.
78. Although Fannie and Freddie's growth has slowed significantly since the end of 2003, each
firm has strong profit incentives to resume growth after resolving its accounting problems. See
Kenneth Posner & David Brown, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Road to Redemption,
MORGAN STANLEY EQUITY RES. N. AM. MORTGAGE FIN., July 6, 2005, at 1, 4 (stating that every
year without legislation constraining Fannie and Freddie's growth "means another year where
higher returns and faster growth are still legally possible" and would warrant higher valuation of
each firm's stock).
79. Most data comparisons in this paragraph compare Dec. 31, 1993, with Dec. 31, 2003. The two
exceptions, annual issuance and average daily trading volume, compare the calendar years 1994 and
2003.
80. For 1993 data, see FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N, [1994] INFORMATION STATEMENT, at 15,
39-40 (1995); FREDDIE MAC, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1994). For 2003 data, see FANNIE MAE,
2003 FORM 10-K, supra note 44, at 24-25; FREDDIE MAC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 29,69 (2004).
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securities-rose 514%, from $287 billion to $1.76 trillion; 81
" their total annual issuance of mortgage-backed securities rose
672%, from $248 billion to $1.91 trillion;
82
" their total outstanding mortgage-backed securities rose 222%,
from $936 billion to $3.01 trillion; 83 and
" the total market value of their publicly traded shares rose 321%,
from $29 billion to $113 billion.84
Fannie and Freddie's growth far outstripped inflation,85
macroeconomic growth,86 and the growth of depository institutions (i.e.,
banks and savings institutions) insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). 87 The GSEs' combined share of total bond-market
debt rose from 15% in 1985 to 27% in 1993 and to 36% in 2003, as
shown in the following chart:
88
81. See supra note 80. By contrast, the federal government's publicly held debt increased 25%.
See Fin. Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, TREASURY BULL., Dec. 2004, at 29 tbl.FD-I.
82. See Bond Mkt. Ass'n, Issuance of Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities,
http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=297 (last visited July 7, 2005).
83. See Bond Mkt. Ass'n, Outstanding Volume of Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities,
http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=1256 (last visited July 7, 2005).
84. For data on the number of shares outstanding, see FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N, [1994]
INFORMATION STATEMENT, at 39-40 (1995); FANNIE MAE, 2003 FORM 10-K, supra note 44, at 123,
174; FREDDIE MAC, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1994). FREDDIE MAC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 25
(2004). For data on closing share prices, see New York Stock Exchange Composite Transactions,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1994, at 15; NYSE Composite Transactions, supra, note 44.
85. The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, a measure of inflation, increased 26%.
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Consumer Price Index-All Urban
Consumers, http://data.bls.gov (follow "CPI-AII Urban Consumers (Current Series), Most
Requested Statistics" hyperlink; then select "U.S. All items, 1982-84
= 100 - CUUROOOOSAO").
86. Real gross domestic product, reflecting economic growth, rose 38%; nominal gross domestic
product, reflecting both inflation and economic growth, rose 65%. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National Economic Accounts: Current-Dollar and "Real" Gross Domestic
Product (June 29, 2005), http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/gdplev.xls.
87. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC BANKING PROFILE 4Q-2003, supra note 13, at 6.
88. See Bond Mkt. Ass'n, Outstanding Level of Public & Private Bond Market Debt,
http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=
3 2 3 (last visited July 7, 2005). The chart subdivides
bond-market debt into the following components, listed here as each appears from the top to the
bottom of the chart: (1) federal, state, and local government securities; (2) money-market
instruments; (3) corporate debt securities, excluding GSE debt; (4) asset-backed securities not
guaranteed by a GSE; (5) GSE-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities; and (6) GSE debt securities.
The debt securities data in the chart include debt securities issued by Sallie Mae, which remained
a GSE until December 2004. See supra note 40. But excluding Sallie Mae would not alter the basic
trend, as Sallie Mae accounted for only a tiny fraction of all GSE liabilities at the end of 2003. Sallie
Mae's non-GSE parent, SLM Corporation (SLM), had $62 million in consolidated total liabilities.
SLM CORP., FORM 10-K FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DEC. 31, 2003, at F-4 (2004). Sallie Mae
accounted for less than half of those liabilities. See id. at 51 (noting that Sallie had $17 million in
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Fannie and Freddie are highly leveraged: they rely heavily on
borrowed money. Together they had a debt-to-equity ratio exceeding
32:1,89 meaning that they had more than $32 in liabilities for each $1 of
shareholders' equity. By contrast, FDIC-insured depository institutions,
although more heavily leveraged than most firms, 90 had a 10:1 debt-to-
equity ratio.91 Fannie and Freddie's slender equity capital and heavy
reliance on debt increase their vulnerability to financial setbacks (e.g., a
sharp rise in interest rates would reduce the value of the firms' assets).92
D. Consequences of Government Sponsorship
Government sponsorship formally gives GSEs a set of explicit
short-term and S5 million in long-term managed borrowings). Even if we treated SLM's total
liabilities as GSE liabilities, they would amount to only 2.3% of all GSE liabilities ($62 million for
SLM divided by $2.60 trillion in total GSE liabilities. See table supra p. 574).
89. See table supra p. 574.
90. See Kaufman, supra note 33, at 387 tbl.2, 390 tbl.3 (showing capital-to-assets ratios in
various industries).
91. See FDIC BANKING PROFILE 4Q-2003, supra note 13, at 5 (dividing total liabilities of $8.25
trillion by equity capital of $831 billion).
92. Other possible risks include mortgage defaults accompanied by a slump in property values,
and mismanaged hedging.
i
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benefits, such as a U.S. Treasury line of credit and exemption from most
state and local taxation. But the greatest benefit of government
sponsorship comes informally, through investors' perception of implicit
federal backing. This perception is GSEs' defining characteristic and has
major consequences for their borrowing costs, size, profits, and
incentives to take risks.
1. GSEs' Explicit Government Benefits
Federal statutes give GSEs various benefits unavailable to ordinary
private firms. These benefits include:
" granting GSEs federal charters,93 which can preempt state laws;94
" authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to extend credit to
GSEs;95
" exempting GSEs from most state and local taxes;
96
* exempting GSEs from having to register their securities under the
Securities Act of 193397 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934;
98
93. See supra notes 35-39.
94. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436-37 (1819) (holding
unconstitutional state law that impeded federal instrumentality's operations); Fed. Land Bank of St.
Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102 (1941) (holding that Congress could immunize
bank's lending functions from state taxation).
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1431(i) (2000) (FHLBS); id. § 1455(c) (Freddie); id. § 1719(c) (Fannie); id.
§ 2279aa-13 (Farmer Mac). The Treasury would extend credit to GSEs by purchasing their debt
securities.
96. Id. § 1433 (FHLBS); id.§ 1452(e) (Freddie); id. § 1723a(c)(2) (Fannie); id. §§ 2023, 2077,
2098, 2134 (Farm Credit System).
97. All five GSEs' securities are exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2000). The Act exempts from registration any security "issued or
guaranteed... by any person ... supervised by and acting as an instrumentality of the Government
of the United States pursuant to authority granted by the Congress of the United States." See id.
§ 77c(a)(2). Because GSEs are federal instrumentalities supervised by the federal government, see
infra Part IV.A, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) exempts their securities from registration. In addition,
Congress has expressly designated as "exempted securities" securities issued by Fannie and Freddie.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1455(g) (Freddie); id. §§ 1719(d)-(e), 1723c (Fannie).
98. Four of the five GSEs enjoy exemption from the registration and reporting requirements of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm. Congress has exempted Fannie and
Freddie by designating their securities as "exempted securities," see supra note 97. An issuer that
has only "exempted securities" outstanding need not register under that Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(a),
(g)(1). An issuer becomes subject to that Act's reporting requirements only if it registers under that
Act or the Securities Act of 1933. See id. §§ 78m(a), 78o(d).
The Treasury Department has exempted the FHLBS and FCS under 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78c(a)(12)(A)(i) (defining "government securities" as "exempted securities"); id. § 78c(a)(42)(B)
(defining as "government securities" securities "issued ... by corporations in which the United
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" imposing no limits on federally chartered depository institutions'
investments in GSE securities; 99
" making GSEs' debt securities and mortgage-backed securities:
* eligible for open-market purchase by the Federal Reserve
Banks; 00
" eligible collateral for deposits of public funds'0 ' and for
loans from Federal Reserve Banks; 10 2 and
* lawful investments for fiduciaries;' 0 3 and
" permitting GSEs to issue and transfer securities through the
Federal Reserve's electronic book-entry system, 10 4 the system
used for issuing and transferring U.S. Treasury securities. '0'
The government also regulates GSEs, 106 generally has the right to
appoint a large minority of GSE directors, 10 7 and generally requires
States has a direct or indirect interest and which are designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for
exemption as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors"); id.
§ 781(a) (not requiring registration of "exempted securities").
Only Farmer Mac has no exemption from registration. See 12 U.S.C. § 2279aa-12(a)(1).
99. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh), 2158 (national banks); id. § 1464(c)(1)(D)-(F), (M) (federal
savings associations); id. § 1757(7)(E) (federal credit unions); see also id. §§ 335, 2158 (state
member banks).
In addition, federal banking statutes, although generally prohibiting FDIC-insured depository
institutions from investing in equity securities, see id. §§ 24(Seventh), 1831a(c)(1), 1831e(c)(1),
permit such institutions to invest in Fannie and Freddie's equity securities and impose no
quantitative limits on such investments. See id. §§ 1455(e)(1), 1464(c)(1)(D)-(F), 1718(d).
100. Id. § 355(2) (obligations of"any agency of the United States"); id. § 2158 (FCS). 12 U.S.C.
§ 355(2) authorizes Federal Reserve Banks to purchase obligations of "any agency of the United
States," which the Federal Reserve Board construes as including obligations issued or guaranteed by
Fannie, Freddie, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System. See 12 C.F.R. § 201.108(b)(2), (5), (16)
(2004).
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1435 (FHLBS); id. § 1452(g) (Freddie); id. § 1723c (Fannie); id. § 2157 (FCS).
102. Id. § 347 (Federal Reserve Banks may make loans secured by obligations "eligible for
purchase" under 12 U.S.C. § 355).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77r-l(a)(l)(D), (2)(D) (Fannie and Freddie); 12 U.S.C. § 1435 (FHLBS); id.
§ 1452(g) (Freddie); id. § 1723c (Fannie); id. § 2157 (FCS); id. § 2279aa-12(c) (Farmer Mac).
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 1435 (FHLBS); id. § 1452(d) (Freddie); id. § 1723a(g) (Fannie); id.
§ 2279aa-3(e) (Farmer); 12 C.F.R. §§ 615.5450(c), 615.5456 (FCS).
105. See generally 31 C.F.R. pt. 306 (2003).
106. See infra Part I.E.
107. The President can appoint five of eighteen directors of Fannie, 12 U.S.C. § 1723(b); five of
eighteen directors of Freddie, id. § 1452(a)(2)(A); and five of fifteen directors of Farmer Mac, id.§ 2279aa-2(b)(2)(C). The Federal Housing Finance Board can appoint six of fourteen directors of
each FHL Bank. Id. § 1427(a). By contrast, the government cannot appoint directors of FCS
institutions. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2012 (credit banks); id. § 2072 (production credit associations).
The Bush Administration no longer makes presidential appointments to GSE boards. Cf. John W.
Snow, Secretary of the Treasury, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
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GSEs to obtain government approval before issuing debt securities.
10 8
2. Investors' Perception of Implicit Government Backing
Bond-market investors-observing how the government gives GSEs
special benefits, uses GSEs to further public purposes, and subjects
GSEs to special restrictions and requirements-infer that the
government implicitly backs GSEs and would not let their creditors go
unpaid. 109 Why else, investors might ask, would Congress exempt GSEs
and their securities from the federal securities laws? Why else would
Congress exempt GSE securities from the usual limits on depository
institutions' investments in nongovernmental securities? These and other
statutes treat GSE securities as having little or no risk-like U.S.
Government securities and unlike even the most highly rated corporate
securities.'10 Thus the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded in
1996 that the federal government sent investors "a strong
implication... that GSE obligations are safe from the risk of default"-
an "assurance... conveyed" by statutes repeatedly treating GSEs like
Housing, and Urban Affairs 3 (Oct. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Snow, 2003 Senate Testimony]
http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ACFB
2
.pdf (declaring the Administration's commitment "to make
sure that the directors of publicly-traded corporations like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are elected
by their shareholders, rather than selected by the President"). The administration has recommended
repeal of such appointment authority. See The Treasury Department's Views on the Regulation of
Government Sponsored Enterprises: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 78
(2003) (statement of John W. Snow).
108. Fannie and Freddie need approval from the Secretary of the Treasury. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1455(j), 1719(b). The FHLBS and FCS need approval from their respective regulators. FHL
Banks need approval from the Federal Housing Finance Board. See id. § 143 1(a); 12 C.F.R. § 966.2.
Farm Credit Banks need approval from the Farm Credit Administration. See 12 C.F.R. § 615(d); see
also 12 U.S.C. § 2013(10) (authorizing banks to issue debt securities "of such character, terms,
conditions, and rates of interest as may be determined as provided for in this Act").
109. STANTON, GSEs, supra note 14, at 33; accord CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra
note 30, at 9; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 8 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 TREASURY GSE REPORT].
110. Some statutes overtly equate GSE securities with government securities. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 defines "government securities" in a way that includes GSE securities. See
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(42) (2000). GSE charters exempt GSE securities from the securities laws "to the
same extent as securities that are direct obligations of... the United States." 12 U.S.C. § 1455(g)
(Freddie); accord id. § 1719(d)-(e), 1723c (Fannie). Statutes also authorize anyone, including a
fiduciary, to invest in GSE securities "to the same extent that such person... is authorized under
any applicable law to ... invest in obligations issued ... or guaranteed ... by the United States." 15
U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1)(D) (Fannie and Freddie); accord 12 U.S.C. § 2279aa-12(c)(l) (Farmer Mac).
Negligible risk also provides the evident rationale for allowing depository institutions to use GSE
securities as collateral for government deposits and for loans from the Federal Reserve Banks.
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the government and unlike private firms."' These statutes "endow[ed]
GSE securities with the appearance of being significantly safer than the
intrinsic credit quality of the GSE would ordinarily warrant." 2 Thus the
CBO, like many financial analysts, regarded investors' perception as
entirely reasonable.
The perception of implicit government backing-often
mischaracterized as an "implicit government guarantee"' 13-persists
despite repeated disclaimers of government liability for GSEs'
obligations, 14  disclaimers ostensibly designed to protect the
government. ' 5 These disclaimers say nothing about implicit backing and
instead focus on formal, legally enforceable liability. For example,
federal statutes require that securities of Fannie, Freddie, and Farmer
Mac include "appropriate language ... clearly indicating" that the
securities "are not guaranteed by the United States and do not constitute
a debt or obligation of the United States or any agency or instrumentality
thereof' other than the GSE in question." 6 This disclaimer merely
restates the obvious: that the government has no formal, legally
enforceable liability for the GSEs' securities. It does not disclaim
implicit backing, nor does it signal that market participants err in
perceiving such backing. It thus avoids the real issue: whether the
government, although not legally bound to rescue the GSEs, would
nonetheless do so (e.g., because it felt a moral obligation for their debts
or feared that a GSE's default might damage the nation's financial
system). "Indeed, the disclaimer itself hints at a special federal
11. CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 9.
112. Id.
113. "Implicit government guarantee" suggests that the government has already guaranteed
GSEs' obligations, albeit without formally expressing that guarantee. From a legal standpoint,
however, an implicit financial guarantee is practically a contradiction in terms, akin to a "mental
will" (purporting to dispose of one's property after one's death) or an "oral traveler's check." In
fact, the true referent is investors' behavior, not the government's behavior. "Implicit guarantee"
refers not to what the government has done but to investors' belief about what the government
would do if a GSE failed-a belief manifest in investors' willingness to lend to GSEs on
exceptionally favorable terms. Using "government guarantee" to describe investors' behavior has
the potential to bias debates about GSE policy by insinuating that the government has a moral
obligation to honor the supposed guarantee. To avoid such problems, this article refers to investors'
"perception of implicit backing" and GSEs' "perceived implicit backing" and avoids terms like
"implicit government guarantee."
114. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1435, 1455(h)(2), 1719(b), (d)-(e), 2155(c), 2279aa-12(a)(2), 4501(4), 4503.
115. See, e.g., id. § 4503 (proudly captioned "Protection of taxpayers against liability").
116. Id. § 1719(b), (d) (Fannie); accord id. § 1455(h)(2) (Freddie); id. § 1719(e) (Fannie); id.
§ 2279aa-12(a)(2) (Farmer Mac).
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relationship; completely private firms do not need to disclaim federal
backing because no one believes such backing exists."' 17 Thus the
disclaimer-in disavowing only formal, legally enforceable liability-
may, ironically, reinforce the perception of implicit backing.
118 Other
required GSE disclaimers have similar flaws.' 19
3. Who Benefits from GSEs' Government Subsidies
In return for large government subsidies, the GSEs claim to provide
three key types of public benefits: overcoming defects in credit markets,
lowering borrowers' interest rates so as to expand home ownership and
support family farms, and stabilizing housing and agricultural credit
markets.120 But the evidence casts doubt on each of these claims. The
improvements in credit markets achieved over the past thirty-five years
would endure even without GSEs. GSEs do not significantly lower
interest rates. Even if they did, lowering interest rates for all or most
117. Ronald C. Moe & Thomas H. Stanton, Government-Sponsored Enterprises as Federal
Instrumentalities: Reconciling Private Management with Public Accountability, 49 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 321, 323 (1989).
118. See STANTON, GSES, supra note 14, at 35.
119. The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 declares that
the three housing GSEs and their obligations are not "backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States." 12 U.S.C. § 4501(4). Thus the statute disclaims formal, legally enforceable liability
(which no one believes exists here) even as it fails to disclaim implicit backing. Another statutory
section specifies that the 1992 Act "may not be construed as obligating the Federal Government,
either directly or indirectly, to provide any funds" to Fannie, Freddie, or the FHL Banks "or to
honor, reimburse, or otherwise guarantee any obligation or liability" of those GSEs. Id. § 4503. This
disclaimer also avoids the real issue. No one argues that the 1992 Act created implicit backing
where it did not already exist. Market participants had long believed such backing to exist under the
GSEs' charters. Congress did not act to correct that perception.
By contrast, the tersest disclaimer-"The United States shall not be liable or assume any liability
directly or indirectly" on FCS debt, 12 U.S.C. § 2155(c)-poses the fewest problems. Although not
specifically mentioning implicit backing, this disclaimer is so categorical that it does not hint at
such backing and can be read as precluding it.
120. See, e.g., Susan M. Wachter, Professor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Feb. 10,
2005), http://banking.senate.gov/_files/wachter.pdf [hereinafter Wachter, 2005 Senate Testimony]
(asserting that Fannie and Freddie increase home ownership, both generally and among low-income
and minority households, by lowering interest rates and down payments; make possible long-term,
fixed-rate, self-amortizing, prepayable mortgages; and stabilize housing markets and national
economy by drawing on long-term capital from foreign investors); Richard F. Syron, Chairman and
CEO, Freddie Mac, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs 3-4 (Apr. 20, 2005), http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ACF87
9
.pdf (asserting that Fannie and
Freddie make possible long-term, fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages and stabilize housing markets
and national economy).
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borrowers would do little to expand home ownership. Moreover, most of
the GSEs' lending and guarantee activities offer returns high enough to
encourage fully private firms to continue those activities in any event.
Credible studies indicate that the GSEs receive large government
subsidies. 12  Wayne Passmore, a Federal Reserve Board economist,
estimates that Fannie and Freddie receive an implicit subsidy capitalized
at some $122 billion to $182 billion. 22  Using a different
methodology,12 3 the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the
three housing GSEs together receive an implicit annual subsidy of $16.7
billion 12 4 to $45 billion 125 plus explicit tax and regulatory exemptions
worth $1.4 billion annually. 126  Passmore and the CBO
"both... conclude that the housing GSEs receive large subsidies and
121. For an analysis of the methodological challenges of valuing the subsidies, see Edward J.
Kane, Housing Finance GSEs: Who Gets the Subsidy? 15 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 197 (1999), and Ron
Feldman, Estimating and Managing the Federal Subsidy of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Is Either
Task Possible?, II J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 81 (1999).
122. Wayne Passmore, The GSE Implicit Subsidy and Value of Government Ambiguity, 33 J.
REAL ESTATE ECON. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 3, on file with author). Under a midpoint
estimate, "shareholders retain roughly 53 percent of the gains.., or about $79 billion." Id.
Passmore notes that the techniques he and the CBO use actually "understate the value of the implicit
subsidy to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac" by assuming that the GSEs would remain the same size
even without their perceived government backing. See id (manuscript at 3 n.5). Loss of that
perceived backing would increase the GSEs' borrowing costs, make some of the GSEs' investment
activities unprofitable, and thus cause the GSEs to shrink. See id.
123. Passmore values the benefits as a stock (accumulation). See id. (manuscript at 4). The CBO
values them as a flow (annual rate). See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at II-
16.
124. See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED ESTIMATES OF THE SUBSIDIES TO THE HOUSING
GSES 5, 8 (Apr. 8, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 CBO ESTIMATES] (estimating 2003 subsidy at $12.5
billion on debt securities and $9.2 billion on mortgage-backed securities). The CBO offers this
explanation of how its estimates differ from Passmore's:
While the gross estimates differ, CBO's and Wayne Passmore's results are generally
consistent. Passmore's study capitalizes the benefit to the GSEs on all outstanding debt and[mortgage-backed securities], whereas CBO's capitalizes the benefit on the incremental changein outstanding issues for the current year. That difference-the value of the stock rather than
the change in the value, or the flow-is the principal reason that Passmore's estimate of thegross subsidy is higher. He also estimates the subsidy pass-through to be much lower-7 basis
points versus the 25 basis points used by CBO. He employs a two-step process to reach thelower value. The first step estimates the spread between jumbo and conforming mortgages andfinds that difference to be 15 basis points to 18 basis points .... The second step attempts to
take account of factors other than the GSEs' sponsored status that affect the spread between
conforming and jumbo mortgages, including differences in transaction cost, credit risk, and
prepayment risk.
Id. at3.
125. See id. at I (estimating total 2003 subsidy at $46 billion if GSEs continue to grow); id. at 6
(valuing explicit tax and regulatory exemptions at $1.3 billion).
126. See id. at 1,6.
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that only a portion of those subsidies reach borrowers," with the rest
going to GSEs' shareholders. 127 In any event, the various benefits GSEs
derive from their government sponsorship (ranging from tax and
regulatory exemptions to reduced borrowing costs) have very real costs
to the government if, as is almost certainly the case, both the GSEs and
their competitors would be willing to pay for those benefits. 28 "If sold
competitively, the benefits the.. . government provides to
the... GSEs"-including the perception of implicit backing-"would
command billions of dollars" annually. 29 Forgoing such revenue
involves an opportunity cost just as real as explicit cash payments. 1
30
Congress created GSEs to help correct defects of U.S. credit markets.
Restrictive bank-branching laws had created regional disparities in the
availability of credit. 131 Regulatory limits on bank-deposit interest rates
had periodically constricted credit. 32 Banks had regarded housing and
agricultural loans as riskier and less profitable than such traditional lines
of business as commercial lending and "tended to withdraw from these
sectors when the need for funds was the greatest."'133 Other large-scale
investors had viewed such loans as too small, illiquid (i.e., difficult to
sell quickly at fair market value), labor-intensive to service,
unpredictable in prepayment, and potentially difficult to collect. 34 GSEs
helped overcome these problems by operating nationwide, offering
investors safe, liquid, large-denomination securities, and making housing
and agricultural loans "more appealing to lenders by creating efficient
secondary markets for resale of the loans."'
35
The GSEs imply that these market improvements depend on GSEs'
continued government sponsorship, as if the old defects would recur if
GSEs lost their subsidies. 136 But such a notion strains credulity. Banks
127. See id. at 3.
128. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at x, 20.
129. Id. at 9.
130. See id. at 9, 20.
131. GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 16; see CBO, PUBLIC
COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 1-2.
132. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 2.
133. GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 17.
134. Id. at 16-17; Bartke, Home Financing, supra note 16, at 3-4.
135. GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 17.
136. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 26-28, 31 (summarizing Fannie
and Freddie's arguments).
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can now operate nationwide 137 and pay market interest rates, and they
find housing and agricultural lending attractive. 138 Fully private firms
routinely securitize loans that once had little or no secondary market,
including automobile, credit card, education, and large residential real-
estate loans. 139 Ending GSEs' government sponsorship would change
none of these realities. Fully private firms would, without any subsidy,
maintain "profitable, high-volume links between the bond and mortgage
markets."1
40
GSEs stress that they further important public purposes, such as
expanding home ownership, by lowering borrowers' interest rates.'14 Yet
subsidizing GSEs does not efficiently further such purposes. GSEs are
"spongy conduits," retaining much of their government subsidies. 42
Fannie and Freddie have a relatively small effect on mortgage interest
rates. A Federal Reserve study concludes that Fannie and Freddie reduce
eligible borrowers' interest rates by only about seven basis points (i.e.,
seven one-hundredths of one percentage point) 143 and retain some $53
billion to $106 billion of a capitalized subsidy estimated at $122 billion
to $182 billion. 44 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that
Fannie and Freddie lower mortgage interest rates by twenty-five basis
points and retain 40% of their government subsidy, 145 and finds the two
GSEs an inefficient vehicle for increasing home ownership. 46 Even by
their own estimates, the GSEs lower interest rates only slightly (e.g.,
137. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(g) (2000) (allowing national banks to establish out-of-state branches); id.
§ 1831u (allowing affiliated banks in different states to merge); id. § 1842(d) (allowing bank
holding companies to acquire banks in any state).
138. In 2004 Rabobank Group, a Dutch bank, offered to buy Farm Credit Services of America,
one of the Farm Credit System's five credit banks. Scott Kilman, Takeover Battle Erupts in Farm
Credit System, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2004, at A3. The offer underscores fully private firms'
willingness to conduct a credit bank's business without government sponsorship.
139. See Greenspan, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 47, at 3. "Securitization" denotes the
process of turning loans into securities. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 46.
140. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at xii. Subsidizing GSEs for their
past achievements makes no more sense than subsidizing AT&T now for Alexander Graham Bell's
invention of the telephone.
141. Id. at 16-18,20,25.
142. Id. at xiv (stating that Fannie and Freddie absorb "nearly $1 for every $2 delivered").
143. See Passmore, Sherlund & Burgess, supra note 32 (manuscript at 3, 30-31).
144. Passmore, supra note 122 (manuscript at 3). Under a midpoint estimate, "shareholders retain
roughly 53 percent of the gains ... or about $79 billion." Id.
145. 2004 CBO ESTIMATES, supra note 124, at 2.
146. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at xiii, 29-31.
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twenty-five to thirty basis points). 147 Moreover, even significantly
lowering interest rates can have surprisingly little effect on long-term
home ownership rates. 148 When interest rates fall, housing prices rise-
so that lower rates may benefit sellers rather than buyers. Nor do lower
interest rates particularly benefit persons for whom low income,
imperfect credit history, or lack of savings for a down payment
represents the greatest barrier to home ownership. The real constraint on
such persons' obtaining mortgage loans is finding primary lenders
willing to bear the risk of default on the loans.149 Depository institutions
and the federal government (through its Federal Housing Administration
and veterans' loan-guarantee programs) bear more of such credit risk
than the GSEs, 150 which have no "edge in identifying good credit risks
among borrowers traditionally regarded as poor credit risks."' 51 On
balance, the GSEs' activities have little effect on home ownership rates.
The GSEs assert that they stabilize markets by buying loans for their
own portfolios even when financial stress leaves investors unwilling to
buy.1 52 Yet the GSEs have'failed to show that they behave much
differently than other profit-maximizing long-term investors. "Private
firms.., are always willing to buy mortgages at prices that are
consistent with their objective of building value for shareholders."
153
According to Federal Reserve economists, Fannie and Freddie's
mortgage purchases have "economically and statistically negligible
effects on mortgage [interest] rates," whether in good times or bad.
154
147. See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER ET AL., THE VALUE OF HOUSING-RELATED GOVERNMENT
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: A REVIEW OF A PRELIMINARY DRAFT PAPER BY WAYNE PASSMORE 2
(2004) (prepared for Fannie), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/commentary/2004/05172004.
jhtml?p=lssues+%26+Commentary.
148. See Gary Painter & Christian L. Redfeam, The Role of Interest Rates in Influencing Long-
Run Homeownership Rates, 25 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 243, 260 (2002) (even large changes
in interest rates have minimal effects on long-term home ownership rates); Ron J. Feldman,
Mortgage Rates, Homeownership Rates, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, in FED. RES.
BANK MINNEAPOLIS, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2002) (same).
149. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at xiii, 30.
150. See Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore, Credit Risk and the Provision of Mortgages to
Lower-Income and Minority Homebuyers, 81 FED. RES. BULL. 989, 1006 (1995).
151. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at xiii.
152. See, e.g., Wachter, 2005 Senate Testimony, supra note 120.
153. CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at xii.
154. See Andreas Lehnert, Wayne Passmore & Shane M. Sherlund, GSEs, Mortgage Interest
Rates, and Secondary Market Activities 30 (Fed. Res. Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working
Paper No. 2005-07, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2005/20050 7 /
200507pap.pdf.
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Indeed, the two GSEs did "nothing special" during the 1998 financial
crisis: 155 their increased purchases "can be explained almost completely
by their historical pattern of buying [more] mortgages" when mortgage
interest rates are high compared to a risk-free interest rate.' 56 As Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan declares, the GSEs' "huge balance
sheets" serve no purpose except to create profits for GSE shareholders
by exploiting the GSEs' perceived government backing. 157
In sum, GSEs provide meager public benefits in return for their
government subsidies, and those subsidies go disproportionately to GSE
shareholders. GSEs lower mortgage interest rates only slightly. GSEs are
an inefficient way of lowering interest rates, and lowering interest rates
is an inefficient way of expanding home ownership. Efficient,
nationwide secondary markets for home mortgages will continue to
thrive even without such subsidies. Financial innovation will proceed
even without such subsidies. Most GSE activities are profit-motivated,
and (with the exception of amassing large debt-funded investment
portfolios) fully private firms would have incentives to continue them.
4. Artificial Growth and Excessive Risk-Taking
Bond-market investors' perception that the government implicitly
backs the GSEs enables the GSEs to borrow enormous sums at interest
rates unwarranted by the GSEs' own financial strength. 58 In addition to
relying on the GSEs' own assets and earning power, investors also rely
on the perceived government backing. Thus government sponsorship
attenuates market discipline by GSEs' creditors: the GSEs can take
greater risks-such as relying more heavily on borrowed money,
investing in more volatile assets, and mismatching the duration of their
assets and liabilities-without correspondingly increasing their
borrowing costs. 159 This encourages GSEs to become artificially large
and take excessive risks.
Government sponsorship operates as an "immensely valuable"
155. Id. at 22.
156. Id.
157. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Statement Before U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 5 (Apr. 6, 2005)
[hereinafter Greenspan, 2005 Senate Testimony], available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/
ACF1505.pdf.
158. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
159. See Ron Feldman, Improving Control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in SERVING Two
MASTERS YET OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 19, at 140-41.
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government "seal of approval."1 60 It enables Fannie and Freddie to
borrow at rates "not available to any fully private firm."1 61 It also renders
the mortgage-backed securities they guarantee top-grade
"without... the expense of... the credit enhancements... required of
fully private intermediaries."1 62 The Congressional Budget Office likens
the perceived implicit backing to a massive government purchase of
nonvoting, no-dividend shares in each GSE, which greatly strengthens
the GSE's creditworthiness. 63 This notional capital-infusion effectively
gives the GSE "more capital than any fully private firm would pay to
acquire or find cost-effective."' 164 It is also open-ended in that if the GSE
"grows, takes on more risk, or ... repurchas[es] its own stock," the
value of the government's commitment increases by enough "to ensure
that the enterprise retains its super Aaa rating."'
' 65
Government sponsorship gives the GSEs enormous advantages in
competing with fully private firms. With lower borrowing and operating
costs, 166 the GSEs can offer lower prices and better terms. The GSEs
have thus grown enormously-at the expense of better-capitalized (and
perhaps better-managed) competitors. Passmore concludes that Fannie
and Freddie's implicit federal subsidy accounts for "roughly 44 percent
to 89 percent of the [two] GSEs' market value,"'167 and that without
government sponsorship, the two GSEs "would be much smaller
organizations," with much smaller portfolios of mortgage-backed
securities and only half their debt-to-equity ratios.' 68 Government
sponsorship has thus fostered huge artificial growth by a few thinly
capitalized firms and a potentially dangerous concentration of financial
risk in those firms. "In essence, the current system depends on [GSE]
risk managers.., to do everything just right," Chairman Greenspan
declares, "rather than depending on a market-based system supported by
160. CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 10.
161. Id.
162. Id. Such credit enhancements include subordinating at least one class of securities, obtaining
a third-party guarantee, and establishing a reserve guarantee fund. Id.
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Regulatory and tax exemptions lower GSEs' operating costs. See 2004 CBO ESTIMATES,
supra note 124, at 6 tbl.2 (valuing housing GSEs' regulatory and tax exemptions at $1.3 billion in
2003).
167. Passmore, supra note 122 (manuscript at 3).
168. See id. (manuscript at 3-4).
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the risk assessments and management capabilities of many participants
with different views and different strategies for hedging.", 69
E. Weaknesses of GSE Regulation
Even as the GSEs' perceived government backing inhibits market
discipline, GSE regulators' institutional weakness-and GSEs' political
cloutlT°-impede regulatory discipline. The federal agencies responsible
for regulating GSEs are small1 71 and hyper-specialized1 72 The Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) regulates only Fannie
and Freddie. 73 The Federal Housing Finance Board regulates only the
Federal Home Loan Bank System. 174 The Farm Credit Administration
regulates only the Farm Credit System and Farmer Mac. 175
The structure of these agencies leaves them chronically vulnerable to
capture or intimidation by the GSEs. The agencies ordinarily toil in
obscurity, closely monitored by the GSEs and their allies but ignored by
169. Greenspan, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 47, at 7 (referring to Fannie and Freddie).
170. See, e.g., Bara Vaida, Taking Cover, 37 NAT'L J. 1610, 1611-13 (2005) (describing power
Fannie and Freddie have long exerted); Bethany McLean, The Fall of Fannie Mae, FORTUNE, Jan.
24, 2005, at 122, 124, 126, 128 (describing Fannie's power).
171. For example, staffing and budget data underscore the limited resources of the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which oversees Fannie and Freddie. For fiscal
year 2003, OFHEO had a $30 million operating budget and the equivalent of 126 full-time
employees. See OFF. OF FED. Hous. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
REPORT TO CONGRESS app. at 3-4 (2004) (Financial Report). Fannie had some 5,000 permanent
employees. See FANNIE MAE, 2003 FORM 10-K, supra note 44, at 17. Fannie had administrative
expenses of $1.46 billion during 2003. Id. at 37. "Between 1998 and 2004, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac hired a combined 88 K Street firms, according to the Center for Public Integrity, and employed
about a dozen in-house lobbyists .... Vaida, supra note 170, at 1612.
Although OFHEO receives no tax money, it must (unlike other GSE regulators, see 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1422b(c), 2250 (2000), and the federal bank regulators, see id. §§ 243, 244, 481, 1467(i)) obtain
an annual congressional appropriation for its budget. See id. § 4516(a) (empowering OFHEO to
collect annual fees from Fannie and Freddie "to the extent provided in appropriation Acts"). Fannie
and Freddie have used the appropriations process to pressure OFHEO and limit its resources. See
Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Op-Ed., Follow the Loan Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, § 4, at 9; see
also McLean, supra note 170, at 132 (quoting OFHEO official's statement that unless OFHEO
appeased Fannie and Freddie, it would "risk getting reamed in the budget"). For reflections on how
dependence on annual appropriations can undercut effective financial regulation, see Joel Seligman,
Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REV. 233, 233, 246-49,
253-56 (2004).
172. See, e.g., Carrell, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 19, at 2 (characterizing OFHEO as "a
small, hyper-specialized agency.., with uncertain funding and overly narrow powers").
173. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4502(6), 4513(a).
174. See id. § 1422a(a)(3).
175. See id. §§ 2243, 2252, 2279aa-l(a)(2).
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most others. The policy issues the agencies handle rarely draw public
attention. The agencies have no institutional tie to any larger entity with
credibility as a financial regulator or policymaker: the Federal Housing
Finance Board and Farm Credit Administration are independent
agencies; 176 OFHEO forms part of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). 17 ' This institutional isolation heightens the
challenge of withstanding the GSEs' formidable political clout.
Moreover, Fannie and Freddie are relatively homogeneous, as are the
twelve Federal Home Loan Banks, which facilitates collective action to
pressure regulators.
GSE regulation suffers from substantive as well as institutional
weaknesses. These substantive weaknesses reflect the GSEs' political
power and the congressional tendency to consider each GSE's regulation
ad hoc. 178 For example, at Fannie and Freddie's insistence, Congress
denied OFHEO some significant authority possessed by bank regulators,
giving OFHEO "a sort of parody of the authority of the federal bank
regulators."' 179 Although bank regulators have broad authority to
prescribe and adjust capital standards, 180 OFHEO faces rigid, detailed
constraints on the form and content of capital standards.' 8 1 It also has
weaker enforcement authority than bank regulators. 
82
176. See id. §§ 1422a(a)(2), 1422b(a) (Federal Housing Finance Board); id. § 2241 (Farm Credit
Administration).
177. See id. § 4511. HUD has little ability to protect OFHEO against pressure from Fannie and
Freddie. HUD has an institutional focus on providing housing rather than on financial-soundness
regulation. HUD has, moreover, been politically weak and on the defensive for most of the past
quarter-century.
178. See supra note 166 (GSEs' political power) and infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text
(ad hoc regulation).
179. See Thomas H. Stanton, Devising an Effective Legal Framework for Supervising the Public
Benefits and Public Costs of Government Sponsored Enterprises, in 2 FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE
MAC: PUBLIC PURPOSES AND PRIVATE INTERESTS 29, 39 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2000) (referring to
OFHEO's enforcement authority).
180. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831o(c)(1), 3907(a).
181. See id. §§ 4611-4612.
182. See Camell, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 19, at 7; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: A FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING GSE
GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT, GAO-04-269T, at 16-17 (2004). Compare 12 U.S.C. §§ 4631-
4636 (OFHEO), with id. § 1818 (federal bank regulators).
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F. Could the Government Avoid Rescuing an Insolvent GSE's
Creditors?
Investors' expectation that the federal government would protect a
failed GSE's creditors' 83 raises a fundamental question: could the
government avoid such a rescue? If as a practical matter the government
must assure full payment of all a failed GSE's liabilities, then no
insolvency mechanism can be truly workable. Yet good reasons exist for
rejecting such fatalism. GSEs' borrowing costs suggest that investors
have some doubt about whether the government would assure full
payment. GSEs pay interest rates lower than comparable fully private
firms 184 but higher than the government itself.1 85 The expectation of a
government rescue reflects probability, not certainty. GSEs' borrowing
costs implicitly recognize the possibility of a delayed or partial rescue or
no rescue at all. 86 Similarly, investors recognize that the government
might protect some creditors but not others. GSEs pay higher interest
rates on subordinated debt' 87 than on more senior liabilities.' 88
Moreover, even a GSE too large to liquidate need not be too large to
reorganize. The government could, for example, create a successor firm
to continue the failed GSE's business with a restructured set of
liabilities.' 89 Finally, the existence and character of GSE insolvency
mechanisms-like other aspects of the legal framework for GSEs-
affects investors' expectations of a rescue. Workable insolvency
mechanisms would tend to increase the credibility of official assertions
that the government does not back GSEs.
183. See supra Part I.D.2.
184. See Ambrose & Warga, supra note 32, at 131, 139, 141-42 tbls.7 & 8, 146; Passmore,
Sherlund & Burgess, supra note 32 (manuscript at exhs.4 & 6).
185. See Ambrose & Warga, supra note 32, at 136, 137 tbl.6.
186. That possibility represents a type of political risk.
187. A GSE's subordinated debt consists of unsecured debt securities whose holders contractually
agree that in any liquidation of the firm they will receive nothing until the firm has fully paid more
senior creditors. See generally W. Scott Frame & Larry D. Wall, Fannie Mae 's and Freddie Mac's
Voluntary Initiatives: Lessons from Banking, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., First Quarter
2002, at 45, 46-50, 52 (discussing Fannie and Freddie's subordinated debt program).
188. See generally Michael T. DeStefano et al., Subordinated Debt Ratings Reflect Unsupported
Creditworthiness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, STANDARD & POOR'S, Mar. 26, 2001 (stating
that Standard & Poor's rates GSEs' subordinated debt "using the same analytical factors that it uses
for [non-GSE] financial institutions"--a standard less favorable than that applied to GSEs' senior
debt).
189. Cf 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n) (2000) (authorizing FDIC to form "bridge bank" to continue failed
bank's business); infra note 284 (discussing bridge banks).
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The role of investors' expectations bears emphasis. As previously
noted, the expectation of a congressional rescue impairs market
discipline on GSEs, enabling GSEs to grow larger and take greater risks
than they otherwise could have.' 90 Greater risk-taking increases the
probability of failure, and greater size increases the potential for a GSE's
failure to disrupt the national financial system and economy. Thus
investors' expectation of a rescue has a certain circularity: it helps create
circumstances that make a rescue more likely.191
But the link between investors' expectations and systemic risk also
creates opportunities to reduce the potential for such risk (and the
pressure for a costly rescue) by taking timely action to correct investors'
expectations. In 1991, Congress curtailed the FDIC's practice of treating
large banks as "too big to fail" (i.e., protecting all depositors regardless
of the $100,000 limit on deposit insurance coverage). 192 It enacted
legislation generally allowing the FDIC to protect a failed bank's
uninsured depositors only if doing so is the "least costly to the deposit
insurance fund of all possible methods" for meeting the FDIC's
obligation to insured depositors. 193 The FDIC responded by changing its
resolution practices, with no adverse effect on financial markets. 194 By
190. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
191. If a GSE's troubles coincide with a broader financial crisis, policymakers will face
additional pressures to rescue the firm. Upsetting longstanding expectations during a crisis risks
creating contagious uncertainty about the government's willingness to meet other important
expectations. A crisis is thus a particularly inopportune time for attempting to re-educate market
participants about the scope of the government's undertakings. If during good times the government
fails to challenge "too big to fail" expectations, it may during a crisis find itself constrained to
rescue a GSE against its better judgment.
192. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 141(a)(1), 105 Stat. 2236, 2273-76 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)); see generally
Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of
1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 363-68 (1993) (explaining statute and its objectives).
193. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4).
194. Before FDICIA, the FDIC used the insurance fund to protect uninsured depositors at banks
with as little as $500 million in total assets. Less than one year later, when an $8.8 billion bank
group in a key state failed shortly before a Presidential election, the FDIC did not protect uninsured
depositors. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE,
1980-1994, at 180, 578 (1998) [hereinafter FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS] (describing how FDIC
dealt with banks owned by First City Bancorporation of Texas). Financial markets took the action in
stride. See, e.g., Dave Pettit, Abreast of the Market: Industrials Leap 35.93 to 3262.21 on Hopes of
Improving Economy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1992, at C2 (reporting market developments without
even mentioning FDIC's action). Rating agencies promptly noted the significance of the FDIC's
action. See, e.g., First City Failure Cuts Support for Bank Ratings Derived From Expectation of
Regulatory Aid, FDIC WATCH, Nov. 9, 1992, at 6 (quoting Moody's Investors Service
commentary).
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giving clear and timely notice of the new policy, Congress had
succeeded in changing market participants' expectations. 95 Similarly
here, the government can reduce the potential for systemic risk-and the
pressure to rescue an insolvent GSE's creditors-by timely adopting
workable insolvency mechanisms.
G. Summary
Investors' perception that the government implicitly backs GSEs lets
GSEs grow larger and take greater risks than they could as fully private
firms. But neither that perception nor government regulation of GSEs'
financial soundness would prevent a GSE from failing. Given GSEs'
size and financial importance, the possibility of failure underscores the
importance of having adequate GSE insolvency mechanisms in place.
Yet irresponsible ambiguity about the extent of the government's
support for GSEs has facilitated congressional neglect of such
mechanisms.
II. IRRESPONSIBLE AMBIGUITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF GSEs
Ambiguity about whether Congress would rescue a failed GSE's
creditors helps produce the central failures of GSE policy: obtaining
insufficient public benefits from the GSEs and providing inadequate
safeguards for the federal government and the financial system. The
ambiguity lets the GSEs and their congressional supporters circumvent
normal mechanisms of government accountability. Bond-market
investors, undeterred by official disclaimers, expect Congress to assure
full payment of GSEs' obligations, 196 enabling GSEs to borrow vast
sums at low interest rates. 197 Yet GSEs' borrowing requires no budget
authority or periodic reauthorization, 198 does not affect the government's
195. By engineering a rescue of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York squandered some of FDICIA's hard-won gains. See Craig Furfine, The
Costs and Benefits of Moral Suasion: Evidence from the Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management
25-27 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2001 -11), available at http://chicagofed.org/
publications/workingpapers/papers/wp2002-1 I.pdf (finding that large, complex banks that were not
LTCM creditors had lower borrowing costs after rescue than before). Yet the dramatic change in
how the FDIC dealt with failed banks during the early 1990s, see supra note 194, shows that
progress can be made in curtailing "too big to fail" treatment.
196. See supra Part I.D.2.
197. See supra note 31 and table p. 574 (GSEs' liabilities).
198. The federal government can spend money only pursuant to congressional appropriation. See
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reported spending or budget deficit,199 and sidesteps ordinary political
scrutiny of government programs and the government's risk-exposure. °°
Although investors bet on a congressional rescue, fiscal accountability
mechanisms assume none would ever occur-creating a blind spot that
heightens policymakers' incentive to gain political advantage by
perpetuating and expanding GSEs' activities.
Far from benefiting citizens and taxpayers, ambiguity fosters
congressional insouciance about the valuable benefits the GSEs receive
from the government. Congress neither demands that the GSEs provide
public benefits, nor charges the GSEs a fee, commensurate with the
value of the benefits the GSEs receive. 20 1 By avoiding normal
government accountability mechanisms, Congress also avoids pressure
to demonstrate that the GSEs' subsidies represent the most effective use
of the resources in question.20 2 This attenuated political accountability
helps GSEs' subsidies persist even if poorly targeted toward public
purposes and gives the GSEs more leeway to favor their shareholders'
interests over their public missions.20 3
Ambiguity also promotes complacency about the risks GSEs pose.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Government officers and employees can spend money and incur obligations
only to the extent authorized by law. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000). Rules of the House of
Representatives generally prohibit appropriations for expenditures not already authorized by law.
See U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. No. 107-284, at
Rule XX cl. 2 (2003). A point of order exists in both Houses of Congress against proposed
legislation that would exceed applicable budget limits. See 2 U.S.C. § 633(t) (2000).
199. See Block, supra note 17, at 438-39; see also 2 U.S.C. § 661c(a) (requiring President's
budget to "reflect the costs of direct loan and loan guarantee programs"); id. § 655(a) (subjecting
budget authority and credit authority to congressional budget process).
200. See generally Ron Feldman, Improving Control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in
SERVING Two MASTERS YET OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 19, at 139-49 (explaining how
policymakers designed GSEs to circumvent normal accountability mechanisms applicable to
government agencies and business firms).
201. See supra Part I.D.3.
202. See Ron Feldman, Improving Control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in SERVING Two
MASTERS YET OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 19, at 143.
203. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 33-35 (asserting that GSE
managers have motive and means to favor shareholders' interests, in part because GSEs need no
congressional appropriations); Kane, supra note 121, at 205-06 (contending that Fannie and
Freddie's "[s]killful lobbying" gives their managers "considerable autonomy" to further
shareholders' interests at taxpayers' expense, and identifying "root problem" as "GSE managers'
lack of adequate accountability for ... the taxpayer subsidies their firms receive"); see also CBO,
PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 34 (arguing that Congress controls GSEs less
effectively than government agencies because GSEs are harder to monitor, have more scope to exert
political influence, and give their managers "incentives ... more sharply at odds with the public
policy goal of maximizing public benefits while minimizing public costs").
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The risk of a future GSE bailout has no current budget cost and usually
poses minimal current political risk. In not formally backing GSEs, 20 4
the government reduces the perceived urgency of keeping GSEs
financially sound and demanding that they provide adequate public
benefits. As Stanton has noted, "the political process does not handle
probabilities well, 2 °5 and the weakness of most GSE financial-
soundness regulation exemplifies "the inability of the political process to
take modest steps now to improve the government's ability to deal with
the slight but real probability that a GSE could fail at a substantial
cost. ' 20 6 The absence of a legally enforceable government guarantee
serves as an excuse for failing to enact adequate financial-soundness
safeguards, including a workable insolvency mechanism for Fannie and
Freddie. The reverse side of that ambiguity-investors' expectation of a
congressional rescue-actually increases the risk of financial problems
by insulating GSEs from market discipline and thus facilitating artificial
growth, inadequate capitalization, and other excessive risk-taking by the
GSEs.2 °7
In sum, by reducing policymakers' accountability for the risks and
other costs of GSEs, ambiguity about the extent of government support
for GSEs heightens the conflict between policymakers' self-interest and
their constituents' interests as citizens and taxpayers. Policymakers can
take political credit for GSE activities even as they curry favor with
GSEs, obtain meager public benefits, and take inadequate precautions
against GSE risk. Ambiguity has thus reduced the perceived urgency of
enacting adequate insolvency mechanisms for GSEs.
III. BANK INSOLVENCY LAW AS A MODEL FOR GSE
INSOLVENCY REGIMES
A specialized insolvency regime has long existed for banks,20 8
204. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1435, 1455(h)(2), 1719(b), (d)-(e), 2155(c), 2279aa-12(a)(2), 4501(4),
4503 (2000) (disclaiming formal, legally enforceable liability).
205. STANTON, GSES, supra note 14, at 46.
206. Id. at 47.
207. See supra Part I.D.4.
208. See generally Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE
L.J. 469, 477-80, 490-95 (1992) (summarizing bank insolvency law, tracing its history, and noting
its policy rationale); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency
Regulation, 76 TEX. L. REv. 723, 728-30 (1998) (summarizing process for resolving failed banks).
Banks have high ratios of debt to equity, invest in assets generally less liquid than their liabilities,
rely heavily on deposits that depositors can withdraw on demand, do not keep enough cash on hand
to repay all depositors, and must redeem deposits at par-all of which make banks vulnerable to
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separate from 209 and antedating the Bankruptcy Code and its
predecessor.210 This streamlined, nonjudicial regime has served as a
model for GSE insolvency law-just as banking regulation has, more
broadly, served as a model for GSE regulation. Bank insolvency law
developed in a world without reliable deposit insurance. It recognized
both banks' fragility and their economic importance. A merchant who
could not promptly pay his bills "is not ruined at once," a court observed
after the Panic of 1907, "and if he should fail the effects are limited to
comparatively a few persons.,21 1 By contrast, if a bank could not meet
its obligations, "[i]ts doors are closed, its business is arrested, its affairs
go into liquidation, and the mischief takes a wide range. 2 12 Depositors
lost access to their money. Borrowers lost access to credit and might
face demands to repay outstanding loans immediately. 213 If one bank's
failure sparked contagious runs against other banks, even worse
problems ensued: other banks had to "fortify themselves against the
uneasiness and even terror of their own depositors" by "call[ing] in their
loans and refus[ing] to extend credit., 214 As a result, the court noted,
"[c]onfidence is destroyed .... Business is brought to a standstill ....
Property is sacrificed, and disaster spreads from locality to locality.
2 15
Bank insolvency law arose to reduce these external costs of bank failure
by expediting depositors' access to their money and reducing the
potential for contagious runs.
2 16
Even more so than banks, GSEs rely heavily on borrowed money.217
Like nineteenth century U.S. banks, GSEs have no federal guarantee and
could harm their creditors if they failed. But prompt resolution of
runs in the absence of credible deposit insurance. See Swire, supra, at 494-95; GEORGE J.
BENSTON, ROBERT A. EISENBEIS, PAUL M. HORVITZ, EDWARD J. KANE & GEORGE G. KAUFMAN,
PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE & SOUND BANKING 41-45 (1986) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE &
SOUND BANKING]; see also Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402-03, 416-18 (1983) (explaining banks'
fragility).
209. Depository institutions, with only a few narrow exceptions, cannot become debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code. See II U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)-(3), (d) (2000).
210. See Swire, supra note 208, at 478-80.
211. Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83 (Kan. 1911).
212. Id.
213. Seeid.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Swire, supra note 208, at 492-93.
217. See supra table p. 574 and text accompanying notes 89-91.
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creditors' claims would help contain the harm. This Part explains how
banking law has provided a model for GSE regulation and bank
insolvency law has provided the main model for GSE insolvency law
(albeit a model that GSE insolvency law has followed only imperfectly).
This Part concludes that GSE insolvency regimes-insofar as they do
not already do so-should follow the example of bank insolvency law
by (1) authorizing a GSE's regulator to appoint a conservator or receiver
through a process permitting timely ex parte action; (2) specifying the
grounds for conservatorship and receivership; (3) affording the GSE a
prompt post-seizure judicial hearing; (4) specifying priorities among
claims; (5) authorizing receivers to establish bridge enterprises; and (6)
authorizing receivers to effect reorganizations.
A. Banking Law as a Model for GSE Regulation
Banking regulation provides the most important model for GSE
218financial-soundness regulation. Drawing on banking regulation makes
sense for substantive and institutional reasons. Banks and GSEs are both
financial institutions and face common challenges, including managing
credit risk and interest-rate risk 219 and operating with higher ratios of
debt to equity than most nonfinancial firms.220 The congressional
committees with jurisdiction over banking-the House Committee on
Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs-also have jurisdiction over the three housing GSEs.22'
Accordingly, Congress has drawn on banking law in framing capital,222
223 224reporting,223 and prompt corrective action requirements for GSEs and
218. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 15, at 620-21 (discussing how Congress used bank capital
rules as model for GSE capital rules); GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note
32, at 4-5, 95 (using bank financial-soundness regulation as standard of reference for GSE
financial-soundness regulation).
219. See GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 95.
220. See Kaufman, supra note 33, at 387 tbl.2 (showing capital-to-assets ratios in various
industries); Joseph P.H. Fan, Sheridan Titman & Garry Twite, An International Comparison of
Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices 41 tbl.2 (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (showing leverage ratios for firms in various industries).
221. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. No. 107-
284, at Rule X, cl. 1(g) (2003); U.S. SENATE, SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. NO. 107-1, at Rule
XXV(d)(1) (2002).
222. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1426(a), 2279bb-1, 2279bb-2, 4611, 4612 (2000).
223. See id. §§ 1440, 2243(4), 2254(b), 2277a-7(8), 2279aa- 11(c), 4501(6), 4513(b)(7),
4513(b)(l 1), 4514.
224. Compare id. § 1831o (FDIC-insured depository institutions), with id. §§ 4613-4618, 4622
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in specifying GSE regulators' examination 225  and enforcement226
powers.
Critics of GSE regulation often point to banking law as substantively
superior to GSE statutes-in particular, as striking a better balance
between public and private interests.2 27 GSE statutes are firm-specific:
each applies to only one or at most two GSEs.228 Congress has created
GSEs ad hoc, "disregarding prior experience., 229 Banking statutes, by
contrast, are largely generic, designed to apply to hundreds or thousands
of disparate banks.23°  Framing laws generically promotes
(Fannie and Freddie), and id. §§ 2279bb-1 to 2279bb-6 (Farmer Mac). See also id. § 1426(h)(3)
(FHLBS).
Prompt corrective action subjects a financial institution to progressively more stringent
restrictions and requirements as the institution's capital declines below required levels. See
generally Camell, supra note 192, at 327-48 (explaining prompt corrective action and its
objectives). Under the prompt corrective action system for depository institutions, a bank is
"adequately capitalized" if it meets all applicable capital standards (e.g., by having at least a 4%
ratio of core capital to total assets), "undercapitalized" if it fails to meet any capital standard,
"significantly undercapitalized" if it falls significantly below any capital standard (e.g., 3% of total
assets), and "critically undercapitalized" if its tangible equity falls below 2% of total assets. See 12
U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1), (c)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 6.4 (2004). The lower an institution's capital category, the
more stringent the applicable safeguards. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(dHf), (h)-(i). The prompt
corrective action regime applicable to Fannie and Freddie has identical names, with different
quantitative definitions, for its capital categories. See id. § 4614.
225. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1440, 2243(2), 2254(a), 2277a-7(8), 2277a-8(b)(1)-(3), 2279aa-
I l(a)(1)(A), 2279aa-1 1(b), 4501(6), 4513(b)(2), 4517.
226. Compare id. § 1818 (FDIC-insured depository institutions), with id. § 1422b(a)(5) (FHLBS),
and id. 9§ 2261-2269, 2273-2275 (FCS), and id. §§ 4631-4641 (Fannie and Freddie).
227. See, e.g., GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S ExPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 97 (calling
financial-soundness regulation of Fannie and Freddie "much weaker" than its bank counterpart);
Richard Scott Carnell, Federal Deposit Insurance and Federal Sponsorship of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac: The Structure of Subsidy, in SERVING Two MASTERS YET OUT OF CONTROL, supra
note 19, at 56, 61-62, 64-71 (arguing that government's perceived implicit backing of Fannie and
Freddie tends to impart a greater net subsidy than FDIC insurance, partly because GSE regulation
has less rigor than bank regulation); Thomas H. Stanton, Federal Supervision of Safety and
Soundness of Government-Sponsored Enterprises, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 395, 426-35, 440-56 (1991)
(advocating that Congress use bank regulation as principal model for strengthening GSE financial-
soundness regulation).
228. The statutes administered by OFHEO apply to both Fannie and Freddie, as do the housing
goals for those enterprises. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4641. The statutes governing Farmer Mac form
part of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, which governs the FCS. Indeed, the FCS officially includes
Farmer Mac. See id. § 2279aa-l(a)(2). But other GSE statutes (such as those cited supra notes 35-
39) apply only to a single, named GSE.
229. 1 NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., REPORT ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 17 (1981).
Although the statement refers to government corporations, it also holds true for GSEs.
230. The Jacksonian free-banking movement, hostile to monopoly and special privilege, helped
transform U.S. banking legislation. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 573, 593 (1985). Chartering a bank had heretofore required
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accountability.231 Without generic law, the government tends to deal ad
hoc with "each institution and set of circumstances ' '232 in ways that tend
to favor the narrow interests of the institution's owners, managers, and
clientele. Generic law "can help to shift the political debate to questions
about whether exceptions to general rules are warranted"-a context less
favorable to those interest groups.
233
This pattern of using banking law as a model for GSE regulation
holds true for GSE insolvency law. Insolvency mechanisms drawn from
banking law apply to Fannie, Freddie, the Farm Credit System, and
234Farmer Mac. Current congressional proposals to strengthen the
mechanisms for Fannie and Freddie also draw heavily on bank
insolvency law.235
B. Bank Insolvency Law: A Synopsis
Under the specialized insolvency regime for banks, a failed bank's
regulator appoints a receiver or conservator for the bank, ex parte and
without prior notice, hearing, or judicial approval.236 Only the regulator
can commence this process; creditors play no formal role.237 A receiver
winds up the bank's business, liquidates the bank's affairs, determines
the validity of creditors' claims against the bank, and pays creditors238 -
special legislation that named the bank and specified its powers. See id. at 572, 593-94. Free-
banking legislation, by contrast, relied on an executive-branch official to charter and regulate banks
under statutes of general application. See id. at 593. Such laws "marked a stage in the evolution of
laws from individual and specific enactments into general statutes of uniform and comprehensive
nature." Id. (referring to 1838 N.Y. statute). Moreover, banking law took shape at a time when
banks were small, numerous, and politically vulnerable, federal deposit insurance did not exist, and
legislators felt a strong imperative to protect depositors, even at the expense of banks' shareholders
and managers.
231. See Moe & Stanton, supra note 117, at 324.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See infra notes 310, 350, 362.
235. See infra Part VI.A.2.
236. See Swire, supra note 208, at 478-79; see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 191 (2000) (national bank
receiver); id. § 1464(d)(2)(A)-(B) (receiver or conservator for FDIC-insured savings institution).
Nor can a court restrain the regulator from appointing a receiver or conservator. See, e.g., id.
§ 1464(d)(2)(D) (FDIC-insured savings institution); Am. Bank, N.A. v. Clarke, 933 F.2d 899, 901,
903 (10th Cir. 1991) (national bank); First Fed. Sav. Bank & Trust v. Ryan, 927 F.2d 1345, 1356-
58 (6th Cir. 1991) (FDIC-insured savings institution).
237. See Swire, supra note 208, at 493; Skeel, supra note 208, at 723-24, 735. See generally id.
at 736-39, 744-66, 779-80 (discussing alternatives to regulators' current monopoly on initiating
insolvency proceedings).
238. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(E). See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RESOLUTIONS
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all in a streamlined and almost purely administrative process. 239 A
conservator, unlike a receiver,240 operates a bank as a going concern,
seeking to rehabilitate the bank or prepare it for orderly sale in
receivership, and has no authority to liquidate the bank.241 The bank as a
corporate entity still exists at the end of a conservatorship but not at the
end of a receivership. (Once a bank has failed, regulators would appoint
only a receiver; conservatorship has no relevance.) The Federal Deposit
Insurance Act242 incorporates this approach 243-as do other federal bank
insolvency statutes244-and makes it applicable to any FDIC-insured
depository institution.245
The process for dealing with a bank failure has three basic steps: (1)
appointing a receiver for the bank; (2) marshaling the bank's assets (i.e.,
identifying and collecting on all items of potential value owned by the
bank); and (3) using the proceeds of those assets to pay valid claims
against the bank in the order of priority established by law. In handling
the failure, the receiver can use a wide range of legal tools, including
tools designed to preserve the failed bank's going-concern value and
minimize disruption to the bank's depositors and other customers.
1. Appointing a Receiver
A bank's primary regulator (i.e., the government agency that issued
the bank's charter) normally appoints any receiver for the bank.24 6 If the
HANDBOOK ch. 7 (2005) (summarizing FDIC's role as receiver) [hereinafter FDIC RESOLUTIONS
HANDBOOK], http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook; FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS,
supra note 194, at 213-22 (summarizing FDIC's historical experience as receiver).
239. See Swire, supra note 208, at 478-79, 492.
240. "The principal difference between a conservator and receiver is that a conservator may
operate and dispose of a bank as a going concern, while a receiver has the power to liquidate and
wind up the affairs of an institution." James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1090
(D.C. Cir. 1996). A receiver can, however, form a "bridge bank" to carry on a failed bank's
business. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n); infra note 284.
241. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D).
242. Id. §§ 1811-1835a.
243. See id. § 182 1(c)-(n).
244. See id. §§ 191-200 (national bank receiver); id. §§ 201-212 (national bank conservator); id.
§ 1464(d)(2)-(3) (federal savings association receiver or conservator); id. § 1787 (credit union
conservator or "liquidating agent").
245. See id. §§ 1813(c), 1821, 1822. FDIC-insured depository institutions comprise the bulk of
the U.S. banking system. Although for brevity this Article refers to "banks," the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act applies equally to savings institutions. See id. § 1813(c)(1).
246. See, e.g., id. § 191 (national banks); id. § 1464(d)(2)(B) (federal savings associations); see
also id. § 1821(c)(10) (authorizing FDIC to appoint itself conservator or receiver to avoid or reduce
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bank has FDIC insurance, the FDIC serves as receiver.247 Many grounds
for receivership (or conservatorship) exist. 248  Some of the more
important grounds include (1) illiquidity-i.e., the bank cannot meet its
obligations in the normal course of business; 249 (2) balance sheet
insolvency-i.e., the bank's liabilities exceed its assets;250 (3) serious
depletion of the bank's capital; 251 (4) failing to submit a capital
restoration plan or materially failing to implement such a plan;252 (5)
failing to correct a capital deficiency after having been formally ordered
to do so;253 (6) being in an "unsafe or unsound condition to transact
business"; 254 (7), substantially dissipating assets or earnings through a
violation of law or an unsafe or unsound practice;2 55 (8) concealing
records or assets or refusing to let authorized examiners inspect
records; 256 and (9) willfully violating a cease-and-desist order.257
The practice of appointing a receiver (or conservator) without prior
notice, hearing, or judicial approval-as expressly authorized by
statute -reflects a judgment that the circumstances will often create a
need to act swiftly, decisively, and discreetly. By the time a bank enters
receivership, it often has scant net worth and dubious prospects, giving
its managers incentives to serve their own interests at creditors'
expense 259 and giving its uninsured depositors incentives to run.260 Both
loss to deposit insurance fund).
247. By law the FDIC serves as receiver for all failed national banks and federally chartered
savings institutions. See id. §§ 191, 1464(d)(2)(E)(ii), 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii). In practice the FDIC also
serves as receiver for state-chartered banks and savings institutions.
248. See id. § 1821 (c)(5).
249. Id. § 1821(c)(5)(F).
250. Id. § 1821(c)(5)(A).
251. See id. § 1821(c)(5)(G) (substantially depleting capital with no reasonable prospect of
recapitalizing); id. § 1821 (c)(5)(K) (undercapitalized with no reasonable prospect of recapitalizing);
id. § 1821 (c)(5)(L) (critically undercapitalized).
252. Id. § 1821(c)(5)(K)(iii)-(iv).
253. Id. § 1821(c)(5)(K)(ii).
254. Id. § 1821 (c)(5)(C).
255. Id. § 182 1(c)(5)(B); see also id. § 182 1(c)(5)(H).
256. Id. § 182 1(c)(5)(E).
257. Id. § 1821(c)(5)(D).
258. See id. §§ 191, 203(a), 1464(d)(2)(B).
259. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 277, 296-97, 306, 309 (1991) (explaining why insolvent or near-insolvent firm's
managers have incentives to take risks likely to deepen creditors' losses); DAVID M. KREPS, GAME
THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 70 (1990) (explaining how, if both players know "at the start
of any round ... that this is the last" round, then one player has an incentive to exploit the other that
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insider misconduct and a run would work against creditors' collective
interest in maximizing the value of the bank's assets.26' The U.S.
Supreme Court has accordingly upheld the appointment of a conservator
without a prior hearing.262 "This is a drastic procedure," the Court
acknowledged, but had become "an almost invariable custom" because
of "the delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of
preserving credit during an investigation. 263 This summary process
placed on regulators "a heavy responsibility to be exercised with
disinterestedness and restraint," the Court concluded, "but in the light of
the history and customs of banking we cannot say it is
unconstitutional., 264 The bank does have a right to a prompt post-seizure
265judicial hearing.
2. Marshaling Assets
In marshaling a failed bank's assets, the receiver identifies all items of
any potential value owned by the bank, including loans, leases,
securities, insurance claims, other financial or nonfinancial contract
rights, buildings, equipment, and current or potential legal claims (e.g.,
lawsuits against directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary
duties).266 The receiver then works to turn such assets into cash.267 It can
also invalidate pre-receivership transfers made to defraud the bank or its
creditors.268
The receiver succeeds to all the bank's "rights, titles, powers, and
would not exist if the player expected the game to continue indefinitely).
260. See Swire, supra note 208, at 495 (explaining uninsured depositors' incentives to run);
PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE & SOUND BANKING, supra note 208, at 41-42 (same).
261. See Swire, supra note 208, at 494-95 (explaining how run would work against creditors'
collective interest); PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE & SOUND BANKING, supra note 208, at 42-45 (same).
262. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947).
263. Id. at 253.
264. Id. at 253-54; accord First Fed. Sav. Bank & Trust v. Ryan, 927 F.2d 1345, 1357-58 (6th
Cir. 1991).
265. 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (conservator for national bank); id. § 1464(d)(2)(B) (receiver or
conservator for FDIC-insured savings association); see James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82
F.3d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that because banking statutes neither require nor
preclude judicial hearing on appointment of receiver for national bank, Administrative Procedure
Act authorizes such hearing).
266. JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER & RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, BANKING LAW
AND REGULATION 747 (3d ed. 2001).
267. Id.
268. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17).
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privileges, 2 69 and can exercise all the powers of the bank's directors,
officers, and shareholders. 270 It can: collect on the bank's assets;27'
transfer loans without the borrowers' consent and deposits without the
depositors' consent;272  terminate burdensome contracts, generally
without incurring more than "actual direct compensatory damages" (i.e.,
no punitive damages or damages for lost profits or pain and suffering); 273
274and merge the bank with another FDIC-insured depository institution.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act generally forbids any court to "take
any action ... to restrain or affect the exercise of [the FDIC's] powers or
functions . .. as a conservator or a receiver., 275
3. Paying Valid Claims in Order of Priority
The receiver notifies creditors to file proof of their claims against the
bank and determines the validity of those claims.276 The receiver
satisfies secured claims-i.e., claims with a perfected security interest
(e.g., mortgage or lien) in property of the bank-from the value of that
collateral. 77 The receiver pays allowed unsecured claims in the order of
priority prescribed by law: (1) administrative expenses of the
receivership; (2) deposits, whether insured or uninsured; (3) "general or
senior" liabilities-a residual category including liabilities that do not fit
the other categories; (4) liabilities subordinated to deposits or general
claims; (5) cross-guarantee liability to the FDIC;278 and (6) shareholders'
269. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
270. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(i).
271. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(ii) (authorizing receiver to "collect all obligations and money due the
institution").
272. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(il).
273. Id. § 1821(e).
274. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(G).
275. Id. § 1821(j); see also id. § 1821(d)(5)(E) (prohibiting judicial review of decision to disallow
claim); id. § 1821(d)(13)(C) (shielding assets in receiver's possession from attachment and
execution); id. § 1821(d)(13)(D) (generally withdrawing courts' jurisdiction over claims relating to
assets of any depository institution in FDIC receivership or acts or omissions of institution or
receiver).
276. Id. § 1821(d)(3)-(8).
277. If the claim exceeds the value of the collateral, the excess constitutes an unsecured claim. Id.
§ 1821 (d)(5)(D)(ii).
278. If an FDIC-insured bank fails and causes a loss to the FDIC, the FDIC can hold any
affiliated FDIC-insured depository institution liable for the loss. Id. § 1815(e)(1)(A), (e)(9). The
FDIC in effect has an option to disregard the corporate separateness of affiliated FDIC-insured
institutions and treat them as a single economic entity.
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claims.279 In keeping with traditional receivership law, the receiver
generally pays all allowed claims within a given priority class before it
makes any payment on claims in the next lower priority class.
280 Thus
general liabilities receive nothing unless all deposits have been paid in
full, and shareholders receive nothing unless all other claims have been
paid in full. If a given class of claims exceeds the assets available to pay
that class, then the claims share pro rata in the available assets.
28
' But the
FDIC as receiver has leeway to deviate from these priorities as long as
each claimant receives no less than it would have received in a straight
liquidation.282
4. Resolution Options
Bank receivership law facilitates rapid action to deal with (or in bank
regulatory jargon, "resolve") a failed or failing bank. The receiver can
liquidate the bank's assets and pay off the bank's liabilities (a
transaction known as a "deposit payoff'); pay a healthy bank to assume
the failed bank's insured deposits ("insured deposit transfer"); or arrange
for an acquirer to purchase some or all of the bank's assets and assume
some or all of the bank's liabilities ("purchase and assumption"). 283 If
the receiver plans to sell the bank as a going concern but has not yet
found an acquirer, the receiver can form a "bridge bank," transfer part or
all of the failed bank's assets and liabilities to the bridge bank, and have
the bridge bank carry on the failed bank's business until an acquirer is
found.284 In forming a bridge bank with some but not all of the failed
279. Id. §§ 1815(e)(2)(C), 182 1(d)(1 1)(A) (listing order of priorities).
280. Id. § 1821(d)(1 1)(A).
281. See First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 1978).
282. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(2).
283. MACEY, MILLER & CARNELL, supra note 266, at 739-43. See generally FDIC, MANAGING
THE CRISIS, supra note 194, at 65-111 (describing evolution of FDIC's resolution practices).
For simplicity, the above summary largely omits the FDIC's role as deposit insurer. When the
FDIC as insurer pays a failed bank's insured depositors, it becomes entitled to receive whatever
share of the failed bank's assets would otherwise have gone to those depositors. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(g)(1).
284. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n) (authorizing FDIC to form bridge bank); see also id.
§ 1821(d)(2)(F) (authorizing FDIC as receiver to form new depository institutions); id. § 1821(m)
(authorizing FDIC to form "new bank"). "A bridge bank is a full-service national bank chartered by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and controlled by the FDIC." FDIC RESOLUTIONS
HANDBOOK, supra note 238, ch. 7. Such a bank "is especially useful ... when the failing bank 
is
large or unusually complex ... or when the bank is in a liquidity crisis." Rosalind L. Bennett,
Failure Resolution and Asset Liquidation: Results of an International Survey of Deposit Insurers,
14 FDIC BANKING REv. 1, 15 (2001). A bridge bank resembles a purchase-and-assumption
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bank's assets and liabilities, the receiver can in effect reorganize the
failed bank.285
The receiver can combine one or more of these resolution options.
Thus, for example, the receiver can establish a bridge bank to carry on
the failed bank's business and later arrange for an acquirer to purchase
the assets and assume the liabilities of the bridge bank. Likewise, after
having an acquirer purchase part of the assets and assume part of the
liabilities of the failed bank, the receiver can use a payoff to dispose of
the remainder. In any event, the receiver can make an immediate partial
payment ("modified payoff") to creditors based on an estimate of what
their claims will ultimately receive from the liquidation.286
C. Proposed Criteria for GSE Insolvency Regimes
A GSE insolvency regime should follow the model of bank
insolvency law by (1) authorizing a GSE's regulator to appoint a
conservator or receiver through a process permitting timely ex parte
action, without hearing or judicial approval; (2) specifying the grounds
for conservatorship and receivership; (3) affording the GSE a prompt
post-seizure judicial hearing; (4) specifying priorities among claims; (5)
authorizing receivers to establish bridge enterprises; and (6) authorizing
receivers to effect reorganizations. Ex parte appointment of conservators
and receivers facilitates swift, decisive, and discreet action to deal with a
faltering firm, while a prompt judicial hearing provides due process.
Specifying the priority of claims reduces the uncertainty that creditors
face. Bridge enterprises and reorganizations can help minimize market-
disruption and tap a failed firm's going-concern value for the benefit of
creditors.
IV. SPECIALIZED GSE INSOLVENCY REGIMES
This Part begins by explaining why GSEs, unlike most firms, cannot
transaction (i.e., purchase of assets and assumption of liabilities) "in which the FDIC itself acts
temporarily as the acquirer." See id. See generally FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS, supra note 194, at
172-209 (describing FDIC's experience using bridge banks).
285. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(F) (2000) (authorizing FDIC as receiver to form bridge bank or
similar entity as successor to failed bank); id. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(lI) (authorizing FDIC to transfer
failed bank's assets and liabilities without creditors' consent); id. § 182 1(i)(2) (specifying that FDIC
owes no claimant more than claimant would have received in straight liquidation, which means that
FDIC need not necessarily transfer or otherwise satisfy face amount of claim); id. § 1821(n) (setting
forth rules for bridge banks).
286. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(10).
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liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code. It will then examine
the specialized insolvency regimes Congress has enacted for each GSE,
evaluating each regime under the criteria developed in Part III. In the
case of Fannie and Freddie, for which no statutory liquidation or
reorganization mechanism exists, this Part also considers two potential
fallback options: using statutory conservatorship to effect a liquidation,
and using common-law receivership to effect a liquidation or
reorganization.
A. Bankruptcy Code Is Inapplicable to GSEs
Most firms, including virtually all ordinary business corporations, can
liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code.287 Neither the GSEs'
charters nor the specialized GSE insolvency statutes specifically prohibit
GSEs from doing so. Thus the question arises whether a GSE could
liquidate or reorganize under the code.
The answer turns on whether a GSE constitutes a federal
"instrumentality" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The code
permits only a "person" to be a debtor under chapter 7 
or 11.288
"Person," as defined in the code, "includes individual, partnership, and
corporation, but [with exceptions irrelevant here] does not include
governmental unit., 289 "Governmental unit" includes an "instrumentality
of the United States., 290  Accordingly, if a GSE is a federal
instrumentality, it is a "governmental unit," not a "person," and cannot
be a debtor under chapter 7 or 11.291
The Bankruptcy Code does not define "instrumentality," 292 and its
legislative history sheds scant light on the term.293 To ascertain whether
287. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 109(a)-(b), (d) (2000).
288. See id. § 109(a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, only a person ... or a
municipality, may be a debtor under this title."). A "municipality"-defined in § 101(40) as a
"political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State"-can be a debtor only under
chapter 9. See id. § 109(b)-(f).
289. Id. § 101(41).
290. Id. § 101(27).
291. See STANTON, A STATE OF RISK, supra note 14, at 206.
292. See II U.S.C. § 101.
293. The House and Senate committee reports on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 both state
that the Bankruptcy Code "defines 'governmental unit' in the broadest sense." H.R. REP. No. 95-
595, at 311 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6268; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 24 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5810. Both reports also indicate that an instrumentality or
other governmental unit must "actually [be] carrying out some governmental function." H.R REP.
No. 95-595, at 311; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 24. Thus "governmental unit" does not include entities
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GSEs are federal instrumentalities for purposes of the code, we must
look to nonbankruptcy statutes and to case law dealing with GSEs and
other federally chartered financial institutions. Congress has expressly
declared Farm Credit System institutions and Farmer Mac "federally
chartered instrumentalities of the United States. 294 Statutes applicable to
the three housing GSEs imply that those firms are also federal
instrumentalities. 295  Courts have classified Fannie, 296 Freddie, 297 the
Federal Home Loan Banks, 298  and FCS institutions 299  as federal
merely because they owe their existence to governmental action "such as the granting of a charter or
a license." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 311; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 24.
The requirement of "actually carrying out some governmental function" provides little useful
guidance for classifying GSEs, because the courts have held that anything that a constitutionally
valid federal instrumentality does is necessarily a governmental function. In Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941), the Supreme Court declared:
The argument that the lending functions of the federal land banks are proprietary rather than
governmental misconceives the nature of the federal government with respect to every function
which it performs. The federal government is one of delegated powers, and from that it
necessarily follows that any constitutional exercise of its delegated powers is governmental. It
also follows that, when Congress constitutionally creates a corporation through which the
federal government lawfully acts, the activities of such corporation are governmental.
Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
294. 12 U.S.C. § 2121 (2000) (banks for cooperatives); accord id. § 2011 (a) (farm credit banks);
id. §2071(a), (b)(7) (production credit associations); id. §2091(a), (b)(4) (federal land bank
associations); id. § 2141(a) (National Bank for Cooperatives); id. § 2211 (credit bank service
corporation); id. § 2279aa-l(a)(1) (Farmer Mac). See generally Dir. of Revenue v. CoBank ACB,
531 U.S. 316, 318 (2001) (classifying FCS as federal instrumentality).
295. Fannie and Freddie must "insert appropriate language" in their "obligations and
securities ... clearly indicating that such obligations and securities ... do not constitute a debt or
obligation of the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof other than the
Corporation." 12 U.S.C. § 1455(h)(2) (Freddie Mac) (emphasis added); accord id. § 1719(b), (d),(e) (Fannie Mae). Using "other than the Corporation" after "agency or instrumentality" implies that
the GSE is a federal agency or instrumentality. As a GSE is not an "agency," see 5 U.S.C. § 105
(2000), it presumably is an "instrumentality." In addition, each FHL Bank can accept deposits from
"any other Federal Home Loan Bank or other instrumentality of the United States." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1431(e)(1) (emphasis added). Pairing "Federal Home Loan Bank" with "other instrumentality of
the United States" implies that FHL Banks are also federal instrumentalities.
296. See Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 178 (9th Cir. 1979).
297. See Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132, 1138-41 (7th Cir. 1992) (classifying
Freddie as federal instrumentality for estoppel purposes but not as federal agency for purposes of
Federal Tort Claims Act). But cf, e.g., Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage
Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1406-09 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding Fifth Amendment's due-process clause
inapplicable to Freddie).
298. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478, 480,
484, 486 (6th Cir. 1977); Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1952).
299. See Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1941);
Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 198, 210-12 (1921) (holding that Congress
properly designated land banks as federal instrumentalities).
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instrumentalities. Courts have also classified national banks, 300 federal
savings associations, 30 1 and federal credit unions 302 -together numbering
more than 8,000 institutions 303-as federal instrumentalities. Although
these decisions did not involve the "instrumentality" provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, they do shed light on the general meaning of federal
"instrumentality."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has specifically held
federal credit unions to be federal instrumentalities, and thus also
"governmental units," for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.304 The case
for treating GSEs as federal instrumentalities--even without any explicit
statute to that effect-is as strong as the case for treating federal credit
unions as instrumentalities: GSEs perform important governmental
functions,30 5 enjoy significant tax exemptions,30 6 and face extensive
government regulation.30 7 The First Circuit held that these three criteria
300. See Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of
Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978).
301. See United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 481 F.2d 963, 969 (1st Cir. 1973).
302. See T I Fed. Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 930-35 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Michigan, 851 F.2d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1988).
303. As of Dec. 31, 2004, the United States had 1,906 national banks, 781 federal savings
institutions, and 5,572 federal credit unions. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC STATISTICS ON
BANKING, DEC. 31, 2004, at B-2 tbl. 101 (2005), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB (select
2003 "End of Year Publication" for "All FDIC-Insured Institutions"); NAT'L CREDIT UNION
ADMIN., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 100 (2005) (federal credit unions).
304. See TIFed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d at 926-27.
305. Congress established GSEs for purposes as important and as "governmental" as those cited
in T I Fed. Credit Union. These purposes include assisting "the secondary market for residential
mortgages (including ... mortgages on housing for low- and moderate-income families... ) by
increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the distribution of investment
capital available for residential mortgage financing," 12 U.S.C. § 1716(3) (2000) (Fannie), accord
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1382(a)(3), 106 Stat.
3672, 4002 (Freddie), "promot[ing] access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation (including
central cities, rural areas, and underserved areas)," 12 U.S.C. § 1716(4) (Fannie), accord Housing
and Community Development Act, § 1382(a)(4) (Freddie), and "improving the income and well-
being of American farmers and ranchers by furnishing sound, adequate, and constructive credit and
closely related services." 12 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (FCS).
306. See 12 U.S.C. § 1433 (FHLBS); id. § 1452(e) (Freddie); id. § 1723a(c)(2) (Fannie); id.
§§ 2023, 2077, 2098, 2134 (FCS). Of all five GSEs only Farmer Mac, which Congress has
expressly declared a federal instrumentality, see id. §2279aa-l(a)(l), has no statutory tax
exemption.
307. GSEs also face government regulation as extensive as that applicable to federal credit
unions. Compare 12 C.F.R. pts. 701-760 (2004) (rules governing credit unions), with id. pts. 611-
630 (FCS), and id. pt. 650 (Farmer Mac), and id. pts. 915-998 (FHLBS), and id. pts. 1720-1777
(Fannie and Freddie's financial soundness), and 24 C.F.R. pt. 81 (2003) (Fannie and Freddie's
housing mission).
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together provided "compelling indicia of federal instrumentality
status., 30 8  Accordingly, GSEs are almost certainly federal
"instrumentalities" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code-and thus, as
"governmental units," cannot become debtors under chapter 7 or 11.
Attempting to use the Bankruptcy Code to deal with a faltering GSE
would, at the very least, involve legal uncertainty so great as to render
the attempt likely to do more harm than good.309
B. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Statutes governing Fannie and Freddie authorize conservatorship 3 10
but not receivership .31 The statutes provide no means for reorganizing a
troubled GSE and do not even specifically authorize liquidating such a
firm.312 Those statutes would furnish only modest support for a
liquidation and none whatever for a reorganization.
1. Limits of Conservatorship
The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight can appoint a
conservator for Fannie or Freddie if the GSE has a serious capital
deficiency, 313 "is not likely to pay its obligations in the normal course of
business, '314 conceals records or assets or refuses to let authorized
examiners inspect records, 315 or willfully violates a cease-and-desist
308. TIFed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d at 934.
309. See infra Part V (legal uncertainty under current conservatorship statute for Fannie and
Freddie could harm GSEs and financial markets).
310. Congress drew the grounds for conservatorship, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4617(a), 4619(a)(1), from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, see id. §§ 1821(c)(5)(D)-(G), (L), 183lo(h)(3)(A). The rules for
judicial review, id. § 4619(b), parallel the Bank Conservation Act. Id. § 203(b). A conservator's
powers under 12 U.S.C. § 4620 have antecedents in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(l 1)(A)(i),
(d)(12), (d)( 7), (e), (i)(3).
311. See id. §§ 4616(b)(6), 4617(a)(1), 4619(a)(1).
312. See id. §§ 4616(b)(6), 4617(a)(1), 4619(a)(1).
313. Id. § 4616(b)(6) (significantly undercapitalized GSE); id. § 4619(a)(1)(B)(ii) (GSE has
substantially depleted its capital with no likelihood of timely replenishment). In these and other
cases (including those referred to in the next two footnotes), OFHEO can appoint a conservator only
if it finds that the "alternative remedies available ... are not satisfactory." See id. § 4616(b)(6)(B)
(significantly undercapitalized GSE); id. § 4619(a)(l)(A) (other circumstances). But the law creates
a presumption favoring conservatorship if a GSE's capital falls low enough to render the firm
"critically undercapitalized." See id. § 4617(a).
314. Id. § 4619(a)(1)(B)(i).
315. See id. § 4619(a)(1)(B)(iii).
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order.31 6 After the conservator takes control of the GSE, the GSE's
directors can challenge the appointment in federal district court.3 17 They
have the burden of proving that the appointment abused OFHEO's
discretion or otherwise violated the law.318
The conservator generally has "all the powers of the shareholders,
directors, and officers of the enterprise under conservatorship and may
operate the enterprise in the name of the enterprise., 31 9 Thus, if the GSE
has sufficiently good prospects, the conservator should be able to
recapitalize the firm by selling new shares (e.g., for cash or in voluntary
exchange for creditors' claims), even if the new shares massively dilute
existing shareholders' ownership.32 °  Other statutes empower the
conservator to avoid fraudulent security interests, 321 enforce certain
types of contracts despite the GSE's conservatorship or insolvency,322
and obtain stays of pending litigation.323
But neither the conservator nor OFHEO has any statutory authority to
require creditors to exchange debt for equity or to accept only partial
payment of their claims.324 This conclusion follows from the terms of the
conservator's authority: the statute granting the conservator "the powers
of the [GSE's] shareholders, directors, and officers, 325 and the absence
of any statute specifically authorizing the conservator to restructure or
impair creditors' claims. Thus, if a GSE's assets fall short of its
liabilities, the conservator lacks statutory power to resolve the
316. See id. § 4619(a)(1)(B)(iv).
317. See id. § 4619(b)(1).
318. See id. § 4619(b)(3).
319. Id. § 4620(a).
320. Under § 4620(a) the conservator can exercise the shareholders' authority to authorize new
shares and the board's authority to issue those shares. Id. § 4620(a).
321. Id. § 4620(b). This innocuous-sounding provision typifies the stinginess of OFHEO's
statutory conservatorship authority. OFHEO can "avoid any security interest taken by a creditor
with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" the GSE or its creditors. Id. But that language is
conspicuously narrower than comparable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C.
§§ 544(b)(1), 548 (2000), bank receivership law, see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(A), or the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4-5, 7 (1984), 7A, pt. II
U.L.A. 301-02, 330, 339-40 (1999). Thus, for example, § 4620(b) does not reach other fraudulent
transfers of property. See 12 U.S.C. § 4620(b). Nor does it make clear whether OFHEO can pursue
any broader remedies afforded by state debtor-creditor law. See id.
322. 12 U.S.C. § 4620(d).
323. Id. § 4620(e).
324. See id. §§ 4616(b)(6), 4617(a)(1), 4619(a)(1).
325. Id. § 4620(a).
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shortfall.326
The constraints on when OFHEO can appoint a conservator-
combined with weak capital requirements,327 reliance on accounting
numbers that may not reflect market value,328 and OFHEO's limited
enforcement powers 32 9 -make the limited scope of a conservator's
authority all the more problematic. By the time OFHEO could place a
GSE in conservatorship, the firm's condition may well have deteriorated
to the point that a conservator cannot resolve the firm's problems.33°
Consider the case of a GSE that has depleted its capital under
circumstances that leave investors wary about the reliability of the firm's
accounting and reporting. Even if the firm actually has a slender positive
net worth and good earnings prospects, prospective equity investors
cannot be sure that is so. Investors may reasonably fear that at market
value the firm's liabilities exceed its assets. Thus, even if offered 99.9%
ownership of the firm, investors might well (given the limits of their
knowledge) balk at restoring the firm's equity to a level that would meet
regulatory capital requirements. The GSE's plight would be even worse
insofar as its liabilities exceeded its assets.
But a failing GSE's prospects would brighten considerably if OFHEO
could appoint a receiver empowered to reorganize the firm. A
reorganization could convert some debt into equity and make the terms
of the remaining debt less onerous. In such a debt-to-equity conversion,
general and senior debtholders might receive restructured debt (e.g., $98
in new debt for each $100 in old debt) plus most of the firm's equity;
subordinated debtholders might receive equity or nothing (depending on
326. Moreover, the conservatorship statute does not make clear the relative priority of creditors'
claims. The statute accords top priority to the expenses of the conservatorship: "All expenses of a
conservatorship pursuant to this section (including compensation pursuant to subsection (f)) shall be
paid by the enterprise... and shall be secured by a lien on the enterprise, which shall have priority
over any other lien." Id. § 4620(h). Specifying that "expenses of a conservatorship" include the
conservator's compensation may suggest that "expenses of a conservatorship" has a narrow
meaning. Thus pre-conservatorship creditors could argue that the term is not so broad as to
encompass all business expenses that the GSE incurs while in conservatorship, including interest
expense. A different ambiguity arises from the rule that if the conservator makes payments to
creditors, "[a]ll creditors who are similarly situated shall be treated in a similar manner." Id.
§ 4620(f). This language suggests pro rata treatment but does not make clear when creditors are
"similarly situated," nor exactly what "in a similar manner" means. See id.
327. See id. §§ 4611-4613.
328. See id. §§ 4612-4613.
329. See sources cited supra note 182.
330. See Larry D. Wall, Robert A. Eisenbeis & W. Scott Frame, Resolving Large Financial
Intermediaries: Banks Versus Housing Enterprises, I J. FIN. STABILITY 386, 406-08, 413 (2005).
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the seriousness of the firm's problems); and the old shareholders might
receive nothing. Thus the firm could emerge from receivership with an
adequate equity cushion and a less onerous debt burden.
Although Fannie and Freddie portray the conservatorship statute as
adequate for dealing with a troubled GSE,33' OFHEO now
acknowledges the statute's inadequacy. In 2003, after considering ways
in which Fannie and Freddie could jeopardize the financial system,332
OFHEO recommended that Congress grant OFHEO receivership
authority.333 Such authority would, according to OFHEO, "provide
greater procedural and substantive certainty to a failed Enterprise's
creditors, ... ensure greater fairness to all market participants,
and... facilitate the liquidation or merger of a failed Enterprise by
clearly authorizing actions relating to outstanding claims that are
essential to such remedies. 334
2. Fallback Options
Fallback options for handling a severely troubled Fannie or Freddie
might include a liquidating conservatorship or a common-law
receivership.
a. Liquidating Conservatorship
The conservatorship statute permits OFHEO to "require a conservator
to set aside and make available for payment to creditors any amounts
that [OFHEO] determines may safely be used for such purpose. 3
35
OFHEO might thus plausibly attempt to use conservatorship to effect a
de facto liquidation, letting the conservator (which could be OFHEO
itself 3 6) make pro rata payments on creditors' claims until no assets
331. See Richard F. Syron, Chairman and CEO, Freddie Mac, Statement Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs II (Feb. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Syron, 2004
Senate Testimony], available at http:/Ibanking.senate.gov/_files/syron.pdf; Franklin D. Raines,
Chairman and CEO, Fannie Mae, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs 13 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?
Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearinglD=93.
332. OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., SYSTEMIC
RISK: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE ROLE OF OFHEO (2003) [hereinafter OFHEO
SYSTEMIC RISK STUDY].
333. Id. at 3-4, 114.
334. Id. at 114.
335. 12 U.S.C. § 4620(f) (2000).
336. See id. § 4619(a)(4)(A).
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remained and then liquidate the firm. But such an approach would
arguably conflict with the congressional decision to deny the conservator
explicit liquidating authority337 and would thus give creditors an opening
to mount both legal and political attacks on the legitimacy of the
conservator's action. In any event, pursuing a de facto liquidation would
tend to impede using the firm's going-concern value for the benefit of
creditors.
b. Common-Law Receivership
Alternatively, OFHEO could request that a federal district court
appoint a receiver for Fannie or Freddie, drawing on the court's inherent
equitable power. Freddie once suggested this possibility, asserting that
"a U.S. district court could appoint a receiver for Freddie Mac under
common law practice. 338 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, before the advent of chapter 11, "equity receivership" was
extensively used to reorganize troubled railroads by restructuring
ownership, rescheduling debts, and converting some debt to equity.339
Assuming that the courts' equitable receivership authority survived the
enactment of chapter 11, at least for firms ineligible to become debtors
under the Bankruptcy Code, attempting to use that approach to deal with
a faltering GSE would be fraught with uncertainty-and with great
potential for delay and market disruption.34 °
C. Federal Home Loan Banks
The Federal Housing Finance Board has broad statutory authority to
liquidate or reorganize "any Federal Home Loan Bank.",34 1 The agency
can take such action "[w]henever the Board finds that the efficient and
economical accomplishment of the purposes of [the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act] will be aided by such action."342 This standard-furthering
337. See id. § 4620.
338. GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 32, at 93 n.5.
339. See Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1440-52 (2004); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY
65-68 (3d ed. 2001); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
IN AMERICA 57-60, 64-68 (2001).
340. The potential for market disruption would be particularly acute under the sort of scenario
considered infra Part V.
341. See 12 U.S.C. § 1446.
342. See id. The liquidation or reorganization must follow "such rules, regulations, and orders as
the Board may prescribe" and provide for paying the bank's liabilities. See id.
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"the efficient and economical accomplishment" of the Act's
purposes343 -is extraordinarily vague. No statute or regulation specifies
those purposes, 344 and courts have summarized the Act's "general
purpose, 345 in terms giving no meaningful guidance for liquidation or
reorganization decisions.346 The Federal Housing Finance Board's
predecessor agency used this authority to abolish and liquidate two FHL
Banks during the late 1940s.347 A federal court of appeals upheld that
action based on the agency's sweeping authority over the FHL Banks,348
but at least one current member of Congress has criticized the action as
high-handed.349
D. Farm Credit System
The Farm Credit Act empowers the Farm Credit Administration
Board (FCA Board) to appoint conservators or receivers for any Farm
Credit System institution, specifies the grounds for such appointments,
and provides for judicial review.350 The board can appoint a conservator
or receiver for any FCS institution that has obligations exceeding its
assets,351  cannot "timely pay principal or interest" on certain
obligations,352 culpably dissipates its assets or earnings,353 is in "an
343. See id.
344. See id. §§ 1421-1449; 12 C.F.R. ch. IX (2004).
345. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478, 486 (6th
Cir. 1977).
346. See Laurens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 365 U.S. 517, 522 (1961)
(summarizing congressional objective as "placing 'long-term funds in the hands of local
institutions' in order to alleviate the pressing need of home owners for 'low-cost, long-term,
installment mortgage money' and to 'decrease costs of mortgage money' with a 'resulting benefit to
home ownership in the form of lower costs and more liberal loans"' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 72-
1418, at 8-10 (1932); S. REP. No. 72-837, at 9-11 (1932))); accord Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., 568 F.2d at 486.
347. See Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 438,440,455, 475 (9th Cir. 1952).
348. Id. at 440-47.
349. See Review of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and Federal Housing
Finance Board: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov 't Sponsored Enters. of the House Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
108th Cong. 4-5 (2004) (statement of Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez).
350. 12 U.S.C. § 2183(b) (2000). Most provisions of the key FCS statute, 12 U.S.C. § 2183(b),
have banking law antecedents. The grounds for appointing a conservator or receiver in
§ 2183(b)(1)-(6) parallel the first six grounds in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, id.
§ 1821(c)(5)(A)-(F). The appointment procedure and rules for judicial review parallel 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2)(B).
351. Id. § 2183(b)(1).
352. Id. § 2183(b)(6).
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unsafe or unsound condition, 354 conceals records or assets or refuses to
let authorized examiners inspect records,355 or willfully violates a cease-
and-desist order.356 The board can make the appointment "ex parte and
without notice," subject to review on the merits in federal district
court.357 In addition, the board can require one credit association to
merge with another if the association "has failed to meet its outstanding
obligations or failed to conduct its operations in accordance with" the
Farm Credit Act.358
The FCA Board has used its general rulemaking authority359 to flesh
out this simple statutory framework. 360 The statute and rules together
provide a legal framework largely adequate for handling troubled FCS
institutions, including power to appoint a conservator or receiver,
grounds for such appointments, a process for judicial review, and agency
rulemaking authority to fill in the details. But the current framework
does not authorize a receiver to reorganize an FCS institution.361 Thus,
for example, the failure of one of the five Farm Credit Banks could
353. Id. § 2183(b)(2).
354. Id. § 2183(b)(3).
355. See id. § 2183(b)(5).
356. See id. § 2183(b)(4).
357. Id. § 2183(b).
358. See id. § 2183(a). To force such a merger, the board needs the concurrence of the
association's credit bank. See id. For the structure of the FCS, see supra Part 1.B.3.
359. See 12 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(9).
360. Under the board's rules, 12 C.F.R. §§ 627.2700-2790 (2004), a receiver or conservator
automatically has "all rights, privileges, and powers of the [institution's] board of directors, officers,
and employees." See id. §§ 627.2720(e), .2775(c). A conservator operates the institution "for the
benefit of the [institution's] creditors and stockholders," id. § 627.2780(a), and has "all powers
necessary to continue the ongoing operations of the institution,... conserve and preserve the
institution's assets and property, and otherwise protect the interests of the institution, its
stockholders, and creditors." Id. § 627.2770(b). The conservator can take action "appropriate or
expedient to the continuing operation of the institution," id. § 627.2780(d), but cannot wind up and
liquidate the institution. See id. § 627.2780(b). A receiver, by contrast, should "wind up the business
operations of such institution, collect the debts owed to the institution, liquidate its property and
assets, pay its creditors, and distribute the remaining proceeds to stockholders." Id.
§ 627.2725(a)(1). The receiver can exercise "all powers necessary to the efficient termination of an
institution's operation." Id.; see also id. § 627.2725(b) (granting receiver more specific powers).
After deciding whether creditors have substantiated their claims, see id. § 627.2740(b), the receiver
pays allowed claims, id. § 627.2740(c) (authorizing payments on creditors' claims), according to
priorities prescribed by regulation. Id. §§ 627.2745-.2752 (establishing priorities). The institution's
shareholders receive any assets remaining after the receiver has paid creditors' claims. Id.
§ 627.2755(b).
361. The board's authority to force a credit association to merge could, however, facilitate a
reorganization.
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endanger the entire Farm Credit System if it depleted the insurance fund
and, through joint-and-several liability, impaired the surviving banks'
net worth.
E. Farmer Mac
The insolvency regime for Farmer Mac substantively resembles that
for Farm Credit System institutions.362 The statute provides somewhat
more detail,363 incorporates by reference some provisions of the FCS
statute and regulation,364 and generally leaves the Farm Credit
Administration Board free to prescribe the details.365 The board's
implementing rules largely resemble those for the FCS. 366 The statute
and rules together supply an adequate legal framework for liquidating
Farmer Mac but do not authorize a reorganization.
F. Summary
The four GSE insolvency statutes vary greatly in substance,
specificity, and the latitude accorded to regulators. A one-sentence
statute grants the Federal Housing Finance Board plenary authority to
liquidate or reorganize a Federal Home Loan Bank, with no procedural
constraints and virtually standardless discretion. At the other extreme,
the statutes for Fannie and Freddie provide too little power, too late:
allowing only conservatorship; delaying the appointment of a
conservator until the GSE is likely to be in serious trouble; not
specifically authorizing a liquidation of even a hopelessly insolvent
GSE; and providing no support whatever for a reorganization. The
statutes governing Farm Credit System institutions and Farmer Mac
362. Farmer Mac's creditors, however, lack some protections applicable to FCS institutions'
creditors. Farmer Mac has no insurance fund. Because Farmer Mac has no affiliates, a receiver
could not merge it into a healthy firm and joint-and-several liability does not apply.
The Farmer Mac insolvency statute, 12 U.S.C. § 2279cc, draws on 12 U.S.C. § 2183 (FCS) and
§§ 4617, 4619, and 4620 (Fannie and Freddie), themselves drawn from banking law. Two of the
statute's four additional grounds for conservatorship and receivership also have antecedents in
banking law. Compare id. § 2279cc(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(C)(i)(II) (inability to pay obligations in normal
course of business; critical undercapitalization), with id. § 1821(c)(5)(F), (c)(5)(L) (same).
363. See id. § 2279cc(c), (f)-(g), (i) (limiting liability, authorizing borrowing, invalidating side
agreements, and canceling charter).
364. See id. § 2279cc(b)(1), (e) (specifying powers of conservator or receiver, and grounds for
appointing conservator or receiver).
365. See id. § 2279cc.
366. Compare 12 C.F.R. §§ 627.2700-.2790 (2004) (FCS), with id. §§ 650.50-68 (Farmer Mac).
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occupy a middle ground. Both statutes authorize appointment of a
conservator or receiver, specify the grounds for such an appointment,
afford judicial review, and allow the board to fill in the details by
regulation. The statutes and implementing rules provide an adequate
framework for liquidating a failed firm and for taking control of a
troubled firm in an attempt to avert failure. But the current framework
does not authorize reorganizing a troubled GSE. Thus if a firm needs a
reorganization to survive, current law tends to steer policymakers
towards forbearance, liquidation, or a congressional rescue.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING INADEQUATE INSOLVENCY
MECHANISMS FOR FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
The current legal mechanisms for dealing with a financially troubled
Fannie or Freddie have serious weaknesses,367 with the potential for far-
reaching practical consequences. This Part examines those
consequences. In particular, uncertainty about the priority of and process
for resolving creditors' claims against Fannie or Freddie could curtail the
firm's access to credit and reduce the market value and liquidity of those
claims. A broader impairment of liquidity in financial markets might
result under some circumstances. Although such an extreme scenario is
unlikely, it is nonetheless plausible-and as OFHEO has observed, "[i]n
analyzing... systemic risk, the important issue is not the likelihood of
the scenarios examined, but the magnitude of the potential adverse
consequences."
368
Problems at Fannie or Freddie could cause significant harm to the
U.S. financial system. Many other financial institutions have large credit
exposures to those firms, having purchased their debt securities, relied
on their guarantees of mortgage-backed securities, and entered into over-
the-counter derivatives contracts with them.369 Thus Fannie or Freddie's
default could affect other financial institutions' solvency and liquidity.37 °
Indeed, "participants in securities and derivatives markets" may have
greater direct exposure to Fannie and Freddie than to "any other
privately owned financial institutions. 371
Attempts to quantify the systemic effects of Fannie or Freddie's
367. See supra Part IV.B.
368. OFHEO SYSTEMIC RISK STUDY, supra note 332, at 93.
369. See id. at 34, 60-66, 77, 100-01.
370. Id. at 31-32, 100-02.
371. See id. at 75.
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default face three formidable technical obstacles: (1) lack of adequate
data about the direct and indirect interdependencies among financial
institutions and financial markets; 372 (2) lack of macro-econometric
models quantifying how "financial variables such as the supply of credit
and interest rates" affect "different types of financial assets and real
variables such as output and employment"; 373 and (3) "the inherent
difficulty in using quantitative techniques to analyze catastrophic events
such as ... financial crises," which occur rarely and "often involve
significant departures from recent historical experience. 374 To sidestep
these obstacles, OFHEO has used "scenario analysis '375 to explore the
possible systemic consequences of problems at Fannie or Freddie. This
analysis underscores the potential for serious problems at either firm-
exacerbated by legal uncertainty related to the conservatorship statute-
to cause systemic harm.
In one scenario, Fannie or Freddie-here called "Enterprise A"-
"unexpectedly incurs large losses," leaving investors doubtful about the
firm's viability and "uncertain about whether it will default, about the
size of any credit losses they may incur, and about the future liquidity of
its debt. 376 Investors respond by selling the firm's debt and mortgage-
backed securities, 377 depressing the price of those securities and
prompting even more investors to try to sell those securities "before the
market becomes illiquid and they can no longer do so.",378 OFHEO
stresses the pivotal importance of how investors and "the federal
government respond to a rapid decline in the liquidity of Enterprise A's
debt" securities and mortgage-backed securities.379 If investors expect
only small credit losses on those securities-or anticipate a
governmental rescue-they may buy up the securities "at bargain
prices," stabilizing the price and "bolster[ing] the liquidity of those
372. Id. at 36, 87.
373. Id. at 87. Such models typically "represent[] the financial sector in a highly aggregated
fashion." Id. Thus, for example, "the model the Congressional Budget Office used to estimate the
economic effects of the thrift crisis did not have a banking sector." Id. n.317.
374. Id. at 87.
375. Scenario analysis involves "the construction and elaboration of hypothetical... scenarios"
to gain "insights into the potential functioning" of the financial system and the economy "under
specific conditions of extreme stress." Id. at 87-88.
376. Id. at 98.
377. See id.
378. Id. at 99.
379. Id.
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securities., 380 If the other GSE in the Fannie-Freddie duo "is financially
strong and able to borrow at reasonable rates," it may rapidly expand its
purchases of mortgage-backed securities and thereby "limit damage to
the housing sector, mortgage lenders, and other housing finance
businesses., 38' But if the market for Enterprise A's debt becomes
illiquid, Enterprise A might have to stop issuing debt and buying
mortgage-backed securities-and investors might question the liquidity
of all banks, savings institutions, and credit unions "whose holdings of
GSE debt and [mortgage-backed securities] are large relative to their
equity capital. 382
"Illiquidity in the market for Enterprise A's debt and the plunge in the
market value of its [mortgage-backed securities] exacerbate liquidity
problems at many banks and thrifts, 383 under OFHEO's scenario.
"Those problems increase the risk of contagious illiquidity spreading
through the banking system, the markets for the obligations of other
GSEs, and the financial sector as a whole" and harming the national and
international economy.384 "[M]any investors become less willing to hold
debt and other fixed-income obligations perceived to pose a significant
degree of credit risk and liquidity risk., 385 "Those developments
substantially reduce the desirability" of using even healthy GSEs' debt
"in hedging or as collateral for repurchase agreements, further reducing
liquidity in financial markets. 386 In sum, this scenario "illustrates how
heightened uncertainty about the liquidity" of an undercapitalized GSE's
debt "could lead to contagious illiquidity in the market for those
securities. Such illiquidity could cause or worsen liquidity or solvency
problems at other financial institutions and disrupt the housing markets
and the financial system. 387
Uncertainty about the priority of claims against a troubled GSE-and
the process for handling such claims-could worsen the GSE's problems
and the potential for harm to financial markets. Although the loss rate
per dollar of debt or mortgage-backed securities would almost certainly
remain low, "the total dollar amount of the Enterprise's losses could be
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 100.
383. Id. at 98.
384. Id.
385. Id. at lOI.
386. Id. at 102.
387. Id. at 105.
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substantial and distributed unevenly among different classes of
investors ' 388  (e.g., holders of debt securities, mortgage-backed
securities, over-the-counter derivatives, and subordinated debt). Current
law leaves investors "uncertain about the potential severity of the losses
specific [classes of] investors would incur if [a faltering GSE]
defaulted."389 Thus investors may fear the worst for each of several
classes of unsecured claims against the firm-as though that class alone
would have to bear the entire loss. 390 Such uncertainty--combined with
creditors' more basic uncertainty about the firm's prospects and the
market value of the firm's assets and liabilities--could further reduce the
firm's access to credit (and hedging devices), the market value and
liquidity of claims against the firm, and under extreme circumstances
even the liquidity of financial markets.
Larry D. Wall, Robert A. Eisenbeis, and W. Scott Frame of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta analyze the potential for a faltering
GSE to harm the financial system and the economy.
391 They conclude
that current law amounts to a recipe for precipitating a congressional
bailout of the GSE's creditors.392 Far from encouraging timely action,
388. Id. at 101.
389. Id. at 100-01.
390. For an example intended to illustrate OFHEO's point about the effect of legal uncertainty
about the priority of claims, id., consider the case of a hypothetical GSE with $100 in total assets
and $103 in total liabilities. The firm's liabilities (all unsecured) consist of $97 in senior debt, $1 in
subordinated debt, $3 in derivatives in loss positions, and $2 in guarantee liability for mortgage-
backed securities:
Senior debt 97
Subordinated debt I
Derivatives in loss positions 3
Guaranty liability for mortgage-backed securities 2
Total Liabilities 103
The firm has guaranteed another $100 in outstanding mortgage-backed securities. Even if in fact
these numbers all accurately reflect market values, the firm's creditors do not know the firm's
condition with certainty and fear that the firm has overstated its assets and understated its liabilities.
In any event, because the firm's liabilities exceed its assets, the firm cannot, if liquidated, satisfy
all of its creditors' claims. Holders of subordinated debt will receive nothing, consistent with their
agreement to be paid only after the firm has fully paid more senior creditors. But the firm's
remaining liabilities ($102) will still exceed its assets ($100), raising questions about the treatment
of the remaining classes of claims: senior debt, derivatives, and guarantee liability, plus the
contingent liability for other outstanding mortgage-backed securities. Insofar as market participants
fear that one class will be paid after the others-and thus have to absorb the $2 loss-the market
value and liquidity of that class could suffer accordingly. And such uncertainty could conceivably
affect two, three, or all classes of claims.
391. See Wall, Eisenbeis & Frame, supra note 330, at 408-15.
392. See id. at 413-14.
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the law ties OFHEO's powers to accounting numbers that may overstate
the GSE's assets and thus mask the seriousness of the firm's
problems.3 93 The law fails, moreover, to specify priority among creditors
or authorize OFHEO to appoint a receiver or organize a bridge
enterprise-and would thus necessitate special legislation if the GSE had
assets worth less than its liabilities.39 4 Congress could face "intense
pressure to act quickly" from the troubled GSE's conservator, creditors,
and mortgage-market customers and from other GSEs.395 Wall,
Eisenbeis, and Frame accordingly regard current law as "designed... to
create substantial spillover effects and force Congress to mitigate [those]
problems" by rescuing the GSE's creditors.396
The lack of a credible receivership mechanism reinforces investors'
perception of implicit government backing by giving Congress little
practical alternative to rescuing an insolvent Fannie or Freddie's
creditors. Current law-in failing to authorize receivership and specify
priority among creditors 397
-would, Chairman Greenspan observes,
make such a rescue "very difficult" to avoid.398 The conservatorship
statute contemplates preserving the GSE as a going concern but, apart
from "the symbolic line of credit at the U.S. Treasury, provides no
means of financing to do So.' 3 99 Thus the statute, in Greenspan's view,
signals that "Congress will bail out the GSEs in the event of a crisis. 4 °°
Having no credible alternative to a rescue augments the perception of
393. See id. at 404, 407.
394. See id. at 413.
395. See id.
396. Id. at 413-14.
397. See Greenspan, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 47, at 8, 11.
398. Hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, FED. NEWS
SERV., Feb. 24, 2004 [hereinafter Senate Hearing Transcript].
399. See Greenspan, 2005 Senate Testimony, supra note 157, at 4.
400. Senate Hearing Transcript, supra note 398. Thus unless Congress intends to make such a
rescue inevitable, Greenspan declares, it should change the law now. See id. By contrast, Fannie,
Freddie, and their allies depict conservatorship as adequate for dealing with a troubled GSE. See
infra notes 411-14 and accompanying text. Susan M. Wachter, a housing finance expert retained by
Fannie and Freddie, goes further and questions whether OFHEO, even with broad receivership
authority, could do anything responsive to the type of systemic crisis posed by a GSE's failure-a
crisis with the potential for a "general lack of liquidity to the overall economy. The government
entity charged with dealing with such threats is the Federal Reserve Board as the lender of last
resort. And it is certainly not clear that OFHEO's actions... would be able... to respond to this
concern." Susan M. Wachter, Comment on "Resolving Large Financial Intermediaries: Banks
Versus Housing Enterprises" by Eisenbeis et al., I J. FIN. STABILITY 447, 449 (2005) [hereinaft r
Wachter, Comment on Wall, Eisenbeis & Frame].
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implicit backing for Fannie and Freddie, as though the government had
401painted itself into a corner.
VI. CORRECTING THE DEFICIENCIES OF CURRENT LAW
An adequate GSE insolvency regime should, as already discussed, (1)
authorize a GSE's regulator to appoint a conservator or receiver through
a process permitting timely ex parte action; (2) specify the grounds for
conservatorship and receivership; (3) afford the GSE a prompt post-
seizure judicial hearing; (4) specify priorities among claims; (5)
authorize receivers to establish bridge enterprises; and (6) authorize
receivers to effect reorganizations.4 °2 Insofar as current GSE insolvency
regimes fall short of meeting this standard, Congress or GSE regulators
should correct the deficiencies by following the model of bank
insolvency law more closely. Thus Congress should authorize OFHEO
to appoint receivers for Fannie and Freddie and empower receivers to
establish bridge enterprises and effect reorganizations. The Federal
Housing Finance Board should adopt a regulation implementing its
statutory authority to liquidate and reorganize Federal Home Loan
Banks. Congress or the Farm Credit Administration Board should
authorize receivers of Farm Credit System institutions and Farmer Mac
to effect reorganizations. As an alternative to correcting the deficiencies
of the specialized GSE insolvency regimes, Congress could authorize
liquidation and reorganization of GSEs under the Bankruptcy Code.
A. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
This Section will begin by discussing the steps Congress should take
to fill the gaps in the insolvency regime for Fannie and Freddie. It will
then note how Congress is currently considering legislation along these
lines. Finally, it will examine the objections Fannie and Freddie have
raised against receivership.
401. The lack of a receivership mechanism probably helps make Fannie and Freddie more
profitable than if the government expressly guaranteed their debts. Although such a guarantee
would reduce the GSEs' borrowing costs, it would require budget authority, have quantitative limits
that would curtail the GSEs' growth, and increase political pressure to demonstrate that subsidizing
GSEs represents the most effective use of the resources in question.
402. See supra Part III.C.
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1. Prescriptions for Reform
Current law authorizes OFHEO to appoint a conservator for Fannie
and Freddie through a process permitting timely ex parte action,
specifies the grounds for conservatorship, and affords the GSE a prompt
post-seizure judicial hearing. Congress should take five key steps to
strengthen this insolvency regime. First, it should authorize OFHEO to
appoint a receiver. Second, it should broaden the current grounds for
conservatorship and make them also apply to receivership. Third, it
should specify priorities among creditors' claims. Fourth, it should
authorize a receiver to establish a bridge enterprise to continue a failed
GSE's business. Finally, it should authorize a receiver to reorganize a
failed or failing GSE so as to make the GSE viable.
2. Congressional Proposals
Congress is currently considering legislation consistent with these
recommendations. After bitter battles over receivership in 2003-2004,403
the House Committee on Financial Services 404  and the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 40 5 have both
approved GSE reform bills with receivership provisions drawing
extensively on the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.40 6 Both bills would
revise the grounds for conservatorship; authorize the regulator to appoint
a receiver if any of those grounds exist; and empower the receiver to
liquidate the GSE, transfer its assets and liabilities, and organize a
successor firm to carry on the GSE's business.40 7 The receiver would
determine the validity of claims against the GSE and pay valid
403. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 170, at 134, 136 (describing receivership-related acrimony).
404. See Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 1461, 109th Cong. § 142 (2005);
H.R. REP. No. 109-171 pt. 1 (2005).
405. See Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005, 109th Cong. § 144 (Comm.
Print, July 22, 2005); Dawn Kopecki, Committee Passes Tighter Regulation of Fannie, Freddie,
WALL ST. J., July 29, 2005, at A2.
406. See H.R. REP. No. 109-171 pt. 1, at 85 (2005) (stating that bill's "receivership language was
modeled after similar provisions in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act that apply to federally insured
depositories"); Staff of S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Section-by-Section
Analysis of the Committee Print 9 (July 22, 2005) (on file with author) (describing receiver's
powers and responsibilities under section 144 of bill as "substantially similar to those of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation").
407. H.R. REP. No. 109-171 pt. 1, at 41-43, 56-60 (2005); Federal Housing Enterprise
Regulatory Reform Act of 2005, 109th Cong. § 144, at 68-77, 144-60 (Comm. Print, July 22,
2005).
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unsecured claims in the following order of priority: (1) administrative
expenses of the receivership; (2) "general or senior" liabilities of the
GSE; (3) obligations "subordinated to general creditors"; and (4)
shareholders' claims.4 °8
3. GSEs' Objections to Receivership
In opposing receivership, Fannie and Freddie argue that (1)
conservatorship deals adequately with troubled GSEs; (2) receivership is
inappropriate for GSEs; (3) bank receivership exists for reasons
irrelevant to GSEs; and (4) enacting receivership could create harmful
uncertainty and make mortgages more costly and less available, unfairly
contravene the expectations of GSEs' creditors, and encourage
privatizing the GSEs. In addition, some critics attribute the Bush
Administration's support for receivership to bad faith and a bias against
housing.40 9 For example, Representative Barney Frank calls receivership
"an artificial issue created by the administration., 410
a. Conservatorship Deals Adequately With Troubled GSEs
GSEs and their allies portray conservatorship as entirely adequate for
dealing with a troubled GSE. Freddie asserts that "current law provides
ample conservatorship powers., 411 Representative Frank declares that
"[tihe existing arrangement is fine." 412 Susan M. Wachter, a housing-
finance expert who has acted as a consultant to Fannie and Freddie,
contends that a troubled GSE "would either be recapitalized through
retained earnings or issuance of new preferred or common stock, or
would be wound down over time if it were no longer viable. Even if the
company were market-value insolvent, it could have significant going-
concern value, and hence could potentially attract new equity capital.
' 413
In asserting that "an insolvent enterprise would either be
408. H.R. REP. NO. 109-171 pt. 1, at 43-47, 48-49, 57 (2005); Federal Housing Enterprise
Regulatory Reform Act of 2005, 109th Cong. § 144, at 80-97, 103-05, 142-43 (Comm. Print, July
22, 2005).
409. See, e.g., Claudia Hirsch, US Tsy's Abernathy: Bush Admin to Keep Pushing GSE Refrm-
US Rep Frank: GSE's 'Crisis' 'Wholly Manufactured' by Administration, THE MAIN WIRE, Apr.
21, 2004 (reporting accusations by Rep. Barney Frank); Bush Accused of Bad Faith in Regulating
Fannie, Freddie, NAT. J. CONG. DAILY, Apr. 20, 2004 (same).
410. See Hirsch, supra note 409.
411. Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11.
412. Hirsch, supra note 409.
413. Wachter, Comment on Wall, Eisenbeis & Frame, supra note 400, at 449.
Washington Law Review
recapitalized... or... wound down over time," Wachter suggests a
smooth, orderly process in which the firm would recapitalize ("through
retained earnings or issuance of new ... stock") if viable and "be wound
down over time if... no longer viable., 414 This rosy view evidently
assumes that (1) market participants would remain willing to refinance
the insolvent firm's maturing obligations and extend whatever additional
credit the firm needs to conduct its business-all at rates and on terms
favorable enough so that the firm remains viable; (2) the relevant
persons, including the conservator and prospective investors, could
timely ascertain whether the insolvent firm is viable; (3) OFHEO would
and should let the firm operate for years with little or no capital while
the firm attempts to rebuild capital through retained earnings; (4) even if
prospective investors conclude that the insolvent firm is not viable, the
process of winding up the firm would remain orderly; and (5) attempting
to deal with an insolvent GSE in this manner-without the option of
effecting a reorganization (e.g., subordinating or converting to equity
some portion of creditors' claims)-would not unacceptably increase the
likelihood of a congressional bailout.
All five of these assumptions merit skepticism. First, investors who
know or believe that the firm's assets fall short of its liabilities will
extend unsecured credit to the firm only on costly terms (which will tend
to undercut the firm's viability)-or in the expectation of a
governmental rescue. Second, if investors have lost confidence in an
insolvent GSE's accounting, they might decline to buy new shares in the
firm even though they would consider the firm an attractive prospect if
they had perfect information about its condition. Moreover, depository
institution regulators' record of forbearance from closing insolvent
institutions 415 casts doubt on whether OFHEO or a conservator could
make better judgments about the GSE's viability than investors can.
Third, such forbearance also casts doubt on whether OFHEO should
allow the firm to operate for years with little or no capital based on
OFHEO's belief that, despite investors' refusal to buy new shares, the
firm remains viable.
Fourth, OFHEO has shown "how heightened uncertainty about the
liquidity of the debt of an undercapitalized Enterprise could lead to
contagious illiquidity in the market for those securities," which in turn
414. See id.
415. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON FIN. INST. REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS
AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 32, 35-39, 51-54 (1993)
(describing role of regulatory forbearance in thrift debacle).
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"could cause or worsen liquidity or solvency problems at other financial
institutions and disrupt the housing markets and the financial system.,
416
Thus OFHEO points to the possibility that an undercapitalized GSE
could have to stop issuing debt-and that the firm's outstanding debt
and mortgage-backed securities could become illiquid, and ultimately
result in "contagious illiquidity spreading through the banking system,
the markets for the obligations of other GSEs, and the financial sector as
a whole, adversely affecting the U.S. and the global economy. 'A 7 Yet
Wachter assumes that a GSE in even worse initial financial condition-
not merely undercapitalized but insolvent and unviable-could "be
wound down over time. 41 8
This brings us to the fifth assumption: that attempting to deal with an
insolvent GSE in this manner would not unacceptably increase the
likelihood of a congressional bailout. To remain in business, the firm
would need to refinance its maturing debt. To keep its borrowing costs
manageable-and avoid a protracted lack of equity-the firm might well
need to persuade investors to buy additional shares. Each of these steps
could prove difficult if investors doubted that the government would
rescue the firm.4 19 We would be naive to expect (much less base public
policy on the assumption) that the firm would necessarily overcome all
such challenges. Thus we should recognize the possibility that
attempting to deal with an insolvent GSE under current law would
"create substantial spillover effects" and precipitate a congressional
bailout.42°
b. Receivership Is Inappropriate for GSEs
Both Fannie and Freddie dismiss receivership as inappropriate for
GSEs. Fannie calls conservatorship "the right model for the GSEs ,42
1
"appropriately different" from the receivership tools available to bank
416. OFHEO SYSTEMIC RISK STUDY, supra note 332, at 105.
417. Id. at 98.
418. See Wachter, Comment on Wall, Eisenbeis & Frame, supra note 400, at 449.
419. Treasury Secretary Snow has disavowed government backing for GSEs, referring to the
"market misperception of an implied guarantee." Snow, 2003 Senate Testimony, supra note 107, at
4. Given this and other indications of diminished political support for such backing, see sources
cited infra note 468, a troubled GSE may find itself unable to borrow on favorable terms such as
those available to Fannie while market-value insolvent during the 1980s. See supra note 32.
420. Wall, Eisenbeis & Frame, supra note 330, at 413-14; see supra Part V.
421. Raines, supra note 331, at 13.
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regulators.422 In Fannie's view, the government has a mere "financial
stake" in federally insured depository institutions,423 whereas it has a
broader policy stake in using Fannie and Freddie to "mak[e]
homeownership more affordable and more available. That is why a
conservator is the appropriate tool to deal with a capital inadequacy
problem at a GSE. The conservator's role is to rebuild the capital of the
GSE and ensure it remains an ongoing concern. 4 24 Freddie emphasizes
that receivership-here equated with liquidation 425-"would have
substantial economic, market and public policy consequences" and
"threaten the public policy mission of the GSEs." 426 Hence "[o]nly
Congress should decide if there is no longer a need for [a GSE as an]
instrument of national policy to support homeownership. ' 427
This objection to receivership erroneously assumes that national
housing objectives require the preservation of the two GSEs with their
liabilities unimpaired and that no reorganized or successor firm could
serve as well. Fannie implies that the two GSEs are unique and possibly
irreplaceable instruments for "making homeownership more affordable
and more available. 428 This is consistent with the GSEs' claim to
provide public benefits-such as lower interest rates, nationwide credit
availability, improved technology, and market stability-worth far more
than the subsidies the GSEs receive from the government. 429 Yet
credible studies indicate that Fannie and Freddie retain much if not most
of their subsidies, reduce borrowers' interest rates only slightly, and
have little effect on home ownership rates.43° Moreover, many private
firms can now replicate the two GSEs' key economic function-linking
the bond and mortgage markets-and will do so without any subsidy.43'
Freddie opposes receivership by implying that the two GSEs are "too
big to fail. '432 Specifically, Freddie calls receivership "an efficient
422. See id. at 10.
423. See id. at 14.
424. Id.
425. See Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11.
426. Id.
427. Raines, supra note 331, at 14; see also Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11
(stating that "Congress reserved to itself the right to appoint a receiver").
428. See Raines, supra note 331, at 14.
429. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 20, 25.
430. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
431. See CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at xii.
432. Had Freddie expressly declared itself "too big to fail," the claim might have struck some
policymakers as presumptuous-and invited closer scrutiny of Freddie's size, government benefits,
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disposition mechanism for thousands of federally insured depository
institutions, whose failure would not threaten the stability of and public
confidence in the financial system. 4 33 But Freddie insists that the
"substantial economic, market and public policy consequences" of
"liquidat[ing] a GSE" preclude receivership from being a "credible
option for dealing with two GSEs. 4 34 Thus receivership makes sense for
lesser firms but not for Fannie and Freddie. 435 But Freddie errs in
suggesting that no middle ground exists between a liquidating
receivership and a rescue-oriented conservatorship: receivership need
not involve liquidation. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code enables
business corporations to reorganize without liquidating.436 The Insurers
Rehabilitation and Liquidation Model Act provides an analogous
process, known as "rehabilitation," for insurance companies. 437 The
FDIC, in transferring a failed bank's assets and liabilities to a successor
entity (such as a bridge bank or a private purchaser), can also carry out a
de facto reorganization.438 A receiver can keep a firm in operation and
tap its going-concern value for the benefit of creditors.
c. Bank Receivership Exists for Reasons Irrelevant to GSEs
Fannie and Freddie suggest that bank receivership exists to protect
FDIC-insured depositors, the federal deposit insurance funds, and the
taxpayers who stand behind those funds-reasons that, in the GSEs'
and financial-soundness regulation as well as the legal framework for handling the failure of a GSE.
By making the point obliquely, Freddie reduced the risk of an adverse reaction.
433. Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11.
434. See id. This argument echoes a 1991 Treasury report: "As a practical matter, receivership is
not a credible regulatory option for an entity as large as certain GSEs .... Nevertheless, given the
significance to the economy of a financial failure of the magnitude that a GSE failure would
represent, the ability to appoint a conservator may be appropriate." U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 15
(1991).
435. See Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11.
436. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(d), 1101-1146 (2000).
437. See INSURERS REHAB. & LIQUIDATION MODEL ACT §§ 16-19 (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs
1999).
438. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(F) (2000) (authorizing FDIC as receiver to form bridge bank or
similar entity as successor to failed bank); id. § 1821 (d)(2)(G)(i)(ll) (authorizing FDIC to transfer
failed bank's assets and liabilities without creditors' consent); id. § 1821(i)(2) (specifying that FDIC
owes no claimant more than claimant would have received in straight liquidation, which means that
FDIC need not necessarily transfer or otherwise satisfy face amount of claim); id. § 1821(n) (setting
forth rules for bridge banks).
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view, have no proper relevance to GSEs. 4 39 Fannie characterizes "FDIC
receivership powers" as "designed to protect insured depositors.' 44 °
Receivership "is critical in the banking system, as a means of protecting
the taxpayer from the exposure created by federal deposit insurance,"
Fannie contends.44 "After the secured creditors, insured depositors have
the first call on the failed bank's assets .... The receiver is necessary in
order to put the FDIC-and thereby the taxpayers-first in line among
the creditors of a failed bank., 442 Similarly, Wachter argues that "bank
regulators need receivership powers because in the event of a bank
failure, they must protect depositors and the depository [sic] insurance
fund."
443
These arguments mischaracterize receivership as a mere adjunct to
deposit insurance. On the contrary, receivership long predates deposit
insurance.4 " Congress enacted the first national bank receivership
statute in 1863, seventy years before federal deposit insurance.446
Receivership also long predates depositors' statutory priority over other
creditors, 4 7 which Congress enacted only in 1993.448 Receivership
existed even before deposit insurance to give depositors and other
creditors of a failed bank quick access to their money and thus to reduce
the external costs of bank failure (e.g., loss and inconvenience to
creditors and damage to the local economy). A workable receivership
mechanism for Fannie and Freddie would offer similar benefits.
439. See Raines, supra note 331, at 13-14; Wachter, Comment on Wall, Eisenbeis & Frame,
supra note 400, at 449; see also Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11 (calling
receivership "an efficient disposition mechanism for thousands of federally insured depository
institutions").
440. Raines, supra note 331, at 13.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Wachter, Comment on Wall, Eisenbeis & Frame, supra note 400, at 449.
444. See Swire, supra note 208, at 477-79, 490-93.
445. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 29, 12 Stat. 665, 673.
446. Act of June 16, 1933, ch 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168-80.
447. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(1 1)(A) (2000). See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
Fannie mischaracterizes the depositor-preference statute as applying only to insured depositors.
Raines, supra note 331, at 13. In fact, the statute makes no distinction between insured and
uninsured depositors: both have priority. See 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(d)(1 1)(A).
448. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 3001(a), 107 Stat. 312,
336.
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d. Enacting Receivership Could Create Harmful Uncertainty and
Make Mortgages More Costly and Less Available
Fannie and Freddie argue that enacting a receivership statute could
create harmful uncertainty and make mortgages more costly and less
available. "It is unclear," Fannie notes, "how ... FDIC receivership
powers.., would apply to Fannie Mae's obligations-our debt, our
[mortgage-backed securities], and our guaranty., 449 By imposing new
risks on GSEs' creditors, a receivership statute "could undermine the
pricing of existing obligations and cast uncertainty on how new
obligations should be priced," posing "risks to the 30-year fixed-rate
mortgage" and resulting in "higher mortgage rates for consumers.
Similarly, Freddie warns that "a change to receivership.., could have
significant implications on [sic] our ability to support the market for 30-
year fixed-rate mortgages. ' '4I In opposing receivership, Senator Paul
Sarbanes declared, "We are literally playing with dynamite here, and we
need to recognize that. 452
Any significant legal reform creates some transitional uncertainty, but
a properly designed receivership statute would greatly reduce legal
uncertainty relating to a troubled GSE. As previously discussed,
uncertainty about the priority of claims against a GSE-and the process
for handling such claims--could worsen the GSE's problems and the
potential for harm to financial markets and housing finance.453
Moreover, the GSEs' arguments underestimate markets' ability to deal
over time with uncertainty. Fannie asserts that a receivership statute
"could undermine the pricing of existing obligations and cast uncertainty
on how new obligations should be priced,... pos[ing] risks to the 30-
449. Raines, supra note 331, at 13.
450. Id. at 13-14. Fannie stressed these themes in a television advertisement broadcast during the
week before the Senate Banking Committee considered Sen. Shelby's draft bill:
The commercials, which began running in heavy rotation in the Washington market during the
last week of March, feature a minority couple talking over their kitchen table about new
congressional regulations for Fannie Mae. "Will that keep us from getting that lower mortgage
rate?" the woman asks in the ad. "Some economists say rates may go up," her partner responds.
"But that could mean we won't be able to afford the new house," she says. A narrator cuts in to
warn Congress against taking the "wrong path" and closing the door of homeownership for
millions of Americans.
Senate Banking Committee Narrowly Passes GSE Regulatory Reform Bill on 12-9 (Nearly) Party-
Line Vote, GSE REP., Apr. 12, 2004, at 5; see also McLean, supra note 170, at 136 (describing same
advertisement).
451. Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11-12.
452. Rob Blackwell, Close Panel Vote Said to Kill GSE Bill, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 2004, at 1.
453. See supra Part V.
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year fixed-rate mortgage. 454 Yet markets deal regularly with uncertainty
about government budget deficits, monetary policy, currency
revaluations, macroeconomic growth and recession, war, terrorism,
natural disasters, and changing consumer preferences. To take more
specific examples, markets already price the risk that future hurricanes
will cause catastrophic losses in Florida 455 that cold weather will
damage orange trees,456 and that the Chilean peso will fall relative to the
euro. 457 Markets should easily be able to handle transitional legal
uncertainty about a receivership statute for two solvent GSEs.
The GSEs' arguments about thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages invite
questions about the value of the GSEs' activities. If Fannie and Freddie
lower mortgage interest rates only slightly,458 how great is the risk that a
receivership statute would cause "higher mortgage rates for
consumers"? 459 If a receivership statute, by increasing Freddie's
borrowing costs, "could have significant implications on our ability to
support the market for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, 46 ° then in what
sense did and does Freddie "support the market"? For its first two
decades Freddie securitized mortgages without holding them in its
portfolio,461 and thus had little need for long-term borrowing. Like
Fannie, Freddie now borrows large sums to finance an investment
portfolio that critics such as Chairman Greenspan say affords little
public benefit--even as such portfolios make the GSEs much riskier
(and more profitable) than if they acted only as securitizers and
guarantors. 462 In any event, homeowners obtained thirty-year fixed-rate
mortgages before Freddie amassed a large investment portfolio.463 They
obtain such mortgages now in the "jumbo" market, which Fannie and
454. Raines, supra note 331, at 13-14.
455. See, e.g., U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR DISASTERS 43-47
(2002).
456. See Richard Roll, Orange Juice and Weather, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 861, 873 (1984)
(concluding that orange-juice futures prices predicted freezing weather in Central Florida even more
accurately than the National Weather Service).
457. See, e.g., Markit, http://www.markit.com (select "Market Valuations (Totem)"; then select
"Foreign Exchange") (last visited July 19, 2005) (describing firm's services, which include
reporting prices of euro-Chilean peso derivatives).
458. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
459. Raines, supra note 331, at 13-14.
460. Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11-12.
461. See STANTON, GSES, supra note 14, at 83.
462. See Greenspan, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 47, at 2-7, 9-10.
463. See Greenspan, 2005 Senate Testimony, supra note 157, at 6.
Vol. 80:565, 2005
Handling the Failure of a GSE
Freddie cannot serve.464 We can reasonably expect that a receivership
statute would not impede homeowners from continuing to obtain such
mortgages.465
e. Enacting Receivership Would Unfairly Contravene the
Expectations of GSEs' Creditors
The GSEs complain that receivership would unfairly contravene the
expectations of GSEs' creditors. According to Fannie, "enacting a
receivership provision unfairly imposes new risks on holders of existing
obligations that they could not have anticipated at the time they
purchased these obligations. 4 66 According to Freddie, receivership
"could potentially disrupt the legal obligations and expectations of
market participants. ''467 Yet the potential for the government to change
the legal framework for Fannie and Freddie-or end their government
sponsorship altogether-has existed all along. It forms part of the
political risk market participants consider when analyzing GSEs' debt
and equity securities. 468 Freddie's own debt agreements foresee the
possibility of receivership by defining the events of default to include
any judicial or other appointment of a receiver but exclude OFHEO's469
appointment of a conservator. In any event, the GSEs' creditors have
464. Fannie and Freddie cannot deal in mortgages that exceed the conforming loan limit, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1454(a)(2), 1717(b)(2) (2000), a dollar amount adjusted for changes in housing prices.
Jumbo mortgages, by definition, exceed that limit.
465. See generally Posner & Brown, supra note 78, at 3 (analyzing Fannie and Freddie's
prospects under pending GSE reform legislation and concluding that the two firms' shares "look
attractively valued, for anything short of a worst-case scenario for a new [GSE] regulatory regime").
466. Raines, supra note 331, at 13.
467. Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11.
468. See, e.g., DeStefano et al., supra note 188 (stating that Standard & Poor's rated GSEs'
subordinated debt "from a financial, not a political, perspective, since the potential for payment
default is present").
In May 2004 Standard & Poor's announced that it no longer had "the highest degree of
confidence that the government would ensure full and timely payment" on the GSEs' senior
unsecured debt securities, and that it had accordingly changed its rating process for GSE securities
to place more weight on the GSEs' own financial condition. See Michael T. DeStefano et al.,
Fannie Mae and Other GSEs Ratings Affirmed, Outlook Stable, STANDARD & POOR'S, May 6, 2004
(on file with author).
469. See, e.g., FED. HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP., DEBENTURE AND MEDIUM-TERM NOTE
AGREEMENT § 7.01 (Apr. 2, 2004). Under this agreement, an "Event of Default" occurs if:
(iii) a court... shall enter a decree or order for relief in respect of Freddie Mac in an
involuntary case under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar law now or
hereafter in effect, or appoint a receiver, liquidator, assignee, custodian, or sequestrator (or
other similar official) of Freddie Mac or for all or substantially all of its property, or order the
winding up or liquidation of its affairs ... ; or (iv) Freddie Mac shall commence a voluntary
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no moral (much less legal) right to demand the continuation of the
current, inadequate insolvency statutes.
f Enacting Receivership Would Encourage Privatization
Opponents characterize receivership as "a stalking horse for
privatization. 4 70 Freddie notes that "[m]any market participants might
view a change to receivership as a first step to privatization of the
GSEs.'4 71 Senator Charles Schumer asserts that the Shelby bill "opens
the door to the complete privatization of Fannie and Freddie-the end of
GSEs as we know [them]. 472 But enacting adequate insolvency
mechanisms for Fannie and Freddie would not remove the two GSEs'
government sponsorship or alter their explicit government benefits.
Investors perceive the government as implicitly backing all GSEs, even
those for which receivership mechanisms already exist.473 Conventional
lists of GSEs' explicit government benefits do not include exemption
from bankruptcy or receivership.474 Thus removing Fannie and Freddie's
government sponsorship would remain a separate decision from enacting
receivership.
g. Summary
Fannie and Freddie's arguments against receivership ignore the
case under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar law now or hereafter in
effect, or shall consent to the entry of an order for relief in an involuntary case under any suchlaw, or shall consent to the appointment of or taking possession by a receiver, liquidator,
assignee, trustee, custodian, or sequestrator (or other similar ojfficial) of Freddie Mac or any
substantial part of its property ....
Id. (emphasis added). The agreement specifies that the "appointment of a conservator (or other
similar official) by a regulator having jurisdiction over Freddie Mac" does not constitute an event of
default. Id.
470. See, e.g., Observers Say the Receivership Provision Will Doom the Bill, GSE REP., Mar. 30,
2004, at II (attributing that view to Senate Banking Committee Democrats).
471. Syron, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 331, at 11.
472. Blackwell, supra note 452.
473. See supra Part I.D.2. By leaving Congress little practical alternative to rescuing Fannie or
Freddie's creditors, the lack of an adequate insolvency mechanism fortifies the perception ofimplicit backing. But enacting such a mechanism would neither preclude such a rescue nor by itself
eliminate the perception.
474. See, e.g., CBO, PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, supra note 30, at 10 (not listing exemption
from bankruptcy or receivership among GSEs' characteristics); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND THE
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION 26 (1996) (same); 1990 TREASURY GSE REPORT,
supra note 109, at 4 (not listing such exemptions among GSEs' links to government).
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shortcomings of the current conservatorship statute
475  and the
availability of nonliquidating forms of receivership,476 misstate bank
receivership law,4 77 and show some lack of candor.
4 78 Their arguments
also rely heavily on vague, unsubstantiated assertions about the cost and
availability of mortgagesa79-assertions at variance with the proliferation
of market-based risk-management mechanisms 480 and with mounting
evidence that the two GSEs reduce mortgage interest rates only
slightly.48' Considering how prominently receivership figured in the
congressional debates of 2004, the GSEs' arguments are strikingly
weak.482
B. Federal Home Loan Bank System
The Federal Housing Finance Board has sweeping statutory authority
to liquidate or reorganize any Federal Home Loan Bank to further the
purposes of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act-purposes nowhere
specified by statute or regulation.483 Yet the board has neither issued an
implementing regulation nor otherwise indicated (e.g., through484
guidelines or a policy statement) how it would use its authority.
Considerable uncertainty exists about when and how the board would
liquidate or reorganize a bank: e.g., under what circumstances the board
would act; what standards and process would apply; and how, given the
475. See supra Parts IV.B.1, V, and VI.A.3.a.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 434-38.
477. See supra text accompanying notes 439-48.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 439-48, 460-64, and 469. Administration officials
reportedly "refer[red] to Fannie's efforts to undermine the receivership provision as 'deceivership."'
McLean, supra note 170, at 134.
479. See supra text accompanying notes 449-51.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 455-57.
481. See supra text accompanying notes 142-47.
482. After the 2004 presidential election, Fannie indicated that it would support GSE regulatory
reform legislation but wanted to ensure "that the federal government would give explicit protection
to mortgage-backed securities holders if Fannie Mae were ever forced into receivership." See
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Fannie Supports New Regulator, But Wants a Say; Company Hopes to Get Its
Way on Bill's Details, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2004, at El (summarizing remarks by Charles V.
Greener, Fannie's Senior Vice President for Communications).
483. See supra Part IV.C.
484. See 12 C.F.R. ch. IX (2004). Federal Housing Finance Board's rules specify that a Federal
Home Loan Bank's capital plan governs its shareholders' rights in any liquidation of the bank, see
id. §§ 931.5, 933.5(b)(1)(v), but do not otherwise deal with liquidation or reorganization of a
Federal Home Loan Bank.
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twelve banks' joint-and-several liability for most of their debt
securities, 485 the board would apportion responsibility for unsatisfied
obligations of the failed bank.486
To reduce this uncertainty and make liquidation and reorganization
more workable, the Federal Housing Finance Board should prescribe a
regulation implementing its statutory authority. The regulation should
clarify the substantive criteria for initiating a liquidation or
reorganization and relate those criteria to relevant purposes of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act, specify procedures for deciding whether
to take such an action, and clarify the operation of joint-and-several
liability so that one FHL Bank's problems would not cast unwarranted
doubt on every other FHL Bank's soundness. Such a regulation would
avoid needless uncertainty about how the board would use its authority,
provide safeguards against arbitrary action, and strengthen the board's
hand in litigation with a faltering FHL Bank.
C. Farm Credit System
The Farm Credit Act and the Farm Credit Administration Board's
rules together provide an adequate legal framework for liquidation but
do not authorize reorganization.487 Congress or the FCA Board shouldfill this gap by authorizing FCS institutions' receivers to reorganize
those institutions. The FCA Board may well be able to fill the gap using
its general rulemaking power,488 under which it has specified receivers'
powers489  and set priorities among creditors. 490 In authorizing
485. 12 U.S.C. § 143 1(b)-(c) (2000); see generally supra notes 34, 55.
486. If one bank defaulted on its share of the consolidated obligations, the board would have
discretion to require any one of the other eleven banks to pay the full amount in default. See 12C.F.R. § 966.9(d)(1). The potential for such action could raise doubts about each other bank'sbalance-sheet solvency, even though the other banks collectively had ample capital to absorb theloss. The banks have voiced concern about the accounting treatment of their joint-and-several
liability, and the Securities and Exchange Commission's staff has responded by indicating "that it
would not object to each Bank reflecting on the face of its balance sheet as long-term indebtedness
only the amount of Consolidated Obligations for which that Bank has received proceeds and istherefore viewed by the Banks as primarily liable." Alan L. Belier, Director, Division of Corporate
Finance, Securities and Exchange Comm., The Application of Federal Securities Law Disclosure
and Reporting Requirements to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks:Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Feb. 10,
2004), available at bttp://www.see.gov/news/testimony/ts021OO4alb.htm.
487. See supra Part IV.D.
488. See 12 U.S.C. § 2 252(a)(9) (authorizing FCA Board to prescribe rules "necessary or
appropriate for carrying out" Farm Credit Act).
489. See 12 C.F.R. § 627.2725.
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reorganization, the board would, similarly, be delimiting receivers'
powers and creditors' rights.
D. Farmer Mac
Farmer Mac's receiver, like a Farm Credit System institution's
receiver, currently lacks authority to reorganize the firm .
4 9
' But
Congress has expressly empowered the Farm Credit Administration
Board to define the receiver's powers and make them "comparable to"
the powers of an FCS institution's receiver.492 Accordingly, if the board
can confer reorganization authority on an FCS institution's receiver, it
can also confer it on Farmer Mac's receiver.493
E. Reducing Potential for Systemic Risk
Curtailing GSEs' investment portfolios and having workable GSE
insolvency mechanisms would reduce the potential for GSEs to pose
systemic risk. The investment portfolios, although highly profitable,494
offer negligible public benefits495 and entail risk: by increasing the
GSEs' indebtedness 496 and exposure to changes in interest rates,
4 97 the
portfolios increase the chances of a GSE failing. Shrinking the portfolios
would thus make failure less likely. It would also reduce other financial
institutions' credit exposure to the GSEs498 and thus reduce the systemic499
harm that a GSE's failure could cause.
490. See id. §§ 627.2745-.2752.
491. See supra Part l.E.
492. See 12 U.S.C. § 2279cc(e) (granting Farmer Mac's receiver "such powers... as shall be
provided pursuant to regulations adopted by the Farm Credit Administration Board" and specifying
that those powers "shall be comparable to the powers" of FCS institution's receiver).
493. See id.
494. See Greenspan, 2005 Senate Testimony, supra note 157, at 3, 5; GAO, GSEs'
NONMORTGAGE INVESTMENTS, supra note 71, at 5, 24, 29-30 (1998).
495. See supra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
496. The GSEs fund their investment portfolios almost entirely with borrowed money. See John
W. Snow, Secretary of the Treasury, Statement Before U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs 4 (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://banking.senate.gov/files/
snowe.pdf.
497. See Greenspan, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 47, at 9-10.
498. Owning a GSE's debt securities exposes other financial institutions to the risk of default by
the GSE. Over-the-counter derivatives contracts, which GSEs use to hedge their exposure to
interest-rate risk, expose counterparty financial institutions to the risk of a GSE default. See OFHEO
SYSTEMIC RISK STUDY, supra note 332, at 34, 65-66.
499. See Greenspan, 2004 Senate Testimony, supra note 47, at 10.
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Workable GSE insolvency mechanisms could further reduce the
potential for systemic risk. By reducing pressure for Congress to rescue
a faltering GSE, such mechanisms would tend to increase market
discipline on GSEs, reduce GSEs' incentive to take unsound risks, and
thus reduce the likelihood of future problems.500 If problems do arise, the
increased market discipline (e.g., through higher borrowing costs) would
encourage more timely corrective action. GSEs' size and importance, far
from obviating workable insolvency mechanisms, underscore the value
of having such mechanisms.
F. Using Bankruptcy Code as an Alternative to Receivership
As an alternative to filling gaps under the current GSE insolvency
regimes, Congress could permit liquidation and reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Code. In basic concept this change would involve making
GSEs "persons" for purposes of the code.0 Congress would need to
decide who could initiate a GSE bankruptcy case. The code allows
voluntary petitions by debtors0 2  and involuntary petitions by
creditors.0 3 By contrast, banking law and current GSE insolvency
statutes allow only regulators to initiate insolvency proceedings.50 4
Although applying the Bankruptcy Code to GSEs can work as a legal
matter, using specialized insolvency regimes based on bank insolvency
law has potential advantages. The congressional committees responsible
for GSEs generally lack familiarity with the Bankruptcy Code, whereas
they tend to have confidence in the FDIC. Having regulators rather than
creditors initiate insolvency proceedings offers some reassurance to
members of Congress skeptical about receivership. Handling insolvency
administratively, rather than judicially, can facilitate preparation and
planning. Other things being equal, an administrative agency can
probably do a better job than a court of planning how to handle the
possibility of a big, one-time insolvency case. Moreover, keying
insolvency to bank-type criteria will tend to produce action sooner than
500. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors, Remarks at the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors State Banking Summit and Leadership Conference (Nov. 6,
2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/gsemankiw speechnov_6_2003.html; Wall, Eisenbeis &
Frame, supra note 330, at 387.
501. See supra notes 287-91. One could, for example, effectuate such a change by specifying that
Fannie and Freddie are "persons" under II U.S.C. § 101(27) (2000).
502. See 11 U.S.C. § 301.
503. See id. § 303(a).
504. See supra Parts iII, IV.
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waiting for the firm to default on its debts-the basic standard for a
firm's creditors to commence an involuntary bankruptcy case. On
balance, I would prefer to rely on specialized insolvency regimes rather
than the Bankruptcy Code.
CONCLUSION
The current insolvency statute for Fannie and Freddie has grave
deficiencies, with potentially serious consequences for the U.S. financial
system. It does not allow a reorganization, nor does it specifically
authorize liquidation. By the time OFHEO can place a GSE in
conservatorship, the firm's condition might have so deteriorated that the
conservator cannot save the firm. If Fannie or Freddie faltered,
uncertainty about priority of and process for handling claims could
worsen the firm's problems and the potential for harm to financial
markets. Such legal uncertainty-combined with creditors' uncertainty
about the firm's prospects and the market value of the firm's assets and
liabilities-could further reduce the firm's access to credit, the market
value and liquidity of claims against the firm, and under extreme
circumstances the liquidity of financial markets. Congress should act
now to authorize OFHEO to appoint a receiver for Fannie and Freddie
under appropriate circumstances, specify priorities among creditors'
claims, and authorize a receiver to establish bridge enterprises and effect
reorganizations. Such reforms would increase market discipline on the
two GSEs and reduce the likelihood of future problems. The insolvency
regimes for the other three GSEs also warrant improvement, notably by
letting agricultural GSEs' receivers effect reorganizations. As an
alternative to specialized insolvency mechanisms, Congress could
remove the current constraints on GSEs becoming debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code.
Ambiguity about the extent of the government's support for GSEs
blunts accountability for the risks and other costs of the government's
relationship to GSEs. Far from yielding significant benefits for citizens
and taxpayers, ambiguity helps explain the central failures of GSE
policy: the government's failure to obtain sufficient public benefits from
the GSEs and to provide adequate safeguards against risks posed by
GSEs. Having no adequate insolvency mechanism for Fannie and
Freddie exemplifies this failure to provide adequate safeguards.
The lack of such a mechanism also reinforces investors' perception of
implicit government backing by giving Congress little practical
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alternative to rescuing Fannie or Freddie's creditors if the firm were to
fail. If one of the other three GSEs failed, the government would have a
legally credible option of letting the GSE's creditors incur a loss. No
similarly credible option exists in the case of Fannie and Freddie. The
lack of such an option augments the perception of implicit backing, as
though the government had painted itself into a corner. The lack of such
an option probably also leaves Fannie and Freddie more profitable than
if the government expressly guaranteed their debts. Although an express
guarantee would reduce the firms' borrowing costs, it would require
appropriations, have quantitative limits that would curtail the firms'
growth, and increase political pressure to demonstrate that subsidizing
GSEs represents the most effective use of the resources in question.
Regulating Fannie and Freddie but having no adequate insolvency
mechanism resembles investing in an elaborate fire-protection system-
complete with firewalls, smoke detectors, heat sensors, alarm bells, and
sprinklers-but neglecting to mount a crucial fire door on its hinges.
Like fire-safety measures, GSE financial-soundness regulation serves
dual purposes. Fire-safety measures protect a building by preventing and
extinguishing fires there; they also protect other buildings by inhibiting
the spread of fire. Similarly, GSE regulation seeks not only to keep the
GSEs themselves safe but to protect the economy from damage that
might result from a GSE's failure. A receivership mechanism, by
providing an orderly means for dealing with a failed GSE's obligations,
would help limit and contain the harm resulting from a GSE's failure.
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